Two Essays on Corporate Income Taxes and Organizational Forms in the United States by Hu, Zhenhua
Georgia State University
ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University
Public Management and Policy Dissertations Department of Public Management and Policy
9-1-2006
Two Essays on Corporate Income Taxes and
Organizational Forms in the United States
Zhenhua Hu
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/pmap_diss
Part of the Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Public Management and Policy at ScholarWorks @ Georgia State
University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Public Management and Policy Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @
Georgia State University. For more information, please contact scholarworks@gsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Hu, Zhenhua, "Two Essays on Corporate Income Taxes and Organizational Forms in the United States." Dissertation, Georgia State
University, 2006.
https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/pmap_diss/11
Two Essays on Corporate Income Taxes and Organizational Forms  
in the United States 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation 
Presented to 
The Academic Faculty 
 
 
 
 
By 
 
 
 
Zhenhua Hu 
 
 
 
 
In Partial Fulfillment 
Of the Requirements for the Degree 
Doctor of Philosophy in Public Policy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Georgia State University 
And 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
 
May, 2006 
 
 
Copyright © 2006 by Zhenhua Hu
Two Essays on Corporate Income Taxes and Organizational Forms  
in the United States 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Approved by:   
   
Dr. Gregory B. Lewis, Advisor 
School of Policy Studies 
Georgia State University 
 Dr. Michael Rushton 
School of Policy Studies 
Georgia State University 
   
Dr. Douglas Noonan 
School of Public Policy 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
 Dr. Bruce Seaman 
School of Policy Studies 
Georgia State University 
   
Dr. Sally Wallace 
School of Policy Studies 
Georgia State University 
  
   
  Date Approved:  January 11, 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[To my wife Jialin Yi] 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 iv 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
I would like to express my sincere appreciation to my advisor, Dr. Gregory Lewis, 
and to dissertation committee members, Dr. Sally Wallace, Dr. Michael Rushton, Dr. 
Bruce Seaman, and Dr. Douglas Noonan. Without their guidance and help, I could have 
never have completed this dissertation. 
I would also like to thank Dr. David Sjoquist, who generously allowed me to use 
the tax revenue dataset from Georgia Department of Revenue. 
Finally, I extend my special thanks to my wife, Jialin Yi, who supports me all the 
time. Her encouragement, consideration, and love sustained me through this journey.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 v
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS iv 
LIST OF TABLES vii 
LIST OF FIGURES viii 
LIST OF SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS ix 
SUMMARY x 
CHAPTER 
1 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1 
2 CHAPTER 2 ESSAY ONE: THE IMPACT OF CORPORATE INCOME TAX ON THE COST 
OF CAPITAL – NEW EVIDENCE FROM C VERSUS S CORPORATIONS 4 
2.1 Introduction 4 
2.2 Literature Review 8 
2.3 A Brief Introduction of S Corporations  10 
2.4 Methodology: Cost of Capital and C vs. S Corporations 15 
2.5 Data 25 
2.6 Findings: Dividend Payout Ratio and C vs. S forms 29 
2.7 CIT Rate and the Choice of C vs. S forms 33 
2.8 Findings: CIT and C vs. S forms 36 
2.9 Regression with an Instrumental Variable 40 
2.9 Conclusions 43 
3 CHAPTER 3 ESSAY TWO: CORPORATE INCOME TAX AND NONPROFIT 
VERSUS FOR-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 45 
3.1 Introduction 45 
3.2 Literature Review  49 
 vi
3.3 A Regression Model  53 
3.4 Hospital Data and CIT History 60 
3.5 Analysis and Results 70 
3.6 Conclusions and Discussion 83 
4 CHAPTER 4 FURTHER DISCUSSION 90 
REFERENCES 94 
VITA   101 
 vii
LIST OF TABLES 
Page 
Table 2.1: Comparison of Cost of Capital under Different Views for Different Forms 21 
Table 2.2: Mean and Standard Deviation of Variables in the Sample 28 
Table 2.3: OLS Regression Results of Dividend Payout Ratio 32 
Table 2.4: Logistic Regression Results 40 
Table 2.5: Regression Results with Instrumental Variables 42 
Table 3.1: Non-Stationarity Tests of Dependent and Independent Variables 71 
Table 3.2: Autocorrelation Check of First-Differenced Variables 73 
Table 3.3: ARIMAX Regression Results 75 
Table 3.4: Arellano-Bond Regression Results 82 
 viii
LIST OF FIGURES 
Page 
Figure 2.1: Cost of Investment Financing 23 
Figure 3.1: Market Share of Nonprofit vs. For-profit Organizations 57 
Figure 3.2: Nonprofit Hospital Market Shares Time Trend 64 
Figure 3.3: Average CIT Rate across Sample Years 67 
Figure 3.4: Nonprofit to For-Profit Ratios of Average Expenditure and Average Price 69 
Figure 3.5: Price/Expenditure Ratios for Nonprofit and For-Profit Hospitals 69 
Figure 3.6 Impacts on Nonprofit Hospitals’ Market Share from One Percentage Point 
Increase in CIT Rate 75 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ix
LIST OF SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
 
m  Shareholder’s marginal tax rate on dividend 
τ   Effective corporate income tax rate 
z  Shareholder’s accrual capital gain tax rate 
ρ  Shareholder’s required rate of return 
Dt  Dividend at time t. 0≥tD  
VNt  New share issued at time t 
Kt  Capital stock at time t 
It  Capital investment at time t 
π( )  Pretax profitability function 
N
V    Minimum level of new share issues 
μ, λ, η, and ξ  Lagrange multipliers 
g   Relative of nonprofit firm over for-profit firm 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 x
SUMMARY 
 
Corporate income taxation has a profound impact on economic behavior in the 
United States. This dissertation focuses on two aspects: the impact of dividend taxation 
on investment and the impact of corporate income tax exemption on nonprofit 
organizations activity. The first essay compares dividend payout ratios of C and S 
corporations to test the validity of the traditional and the new views on dividend taxation. 
Average corporate income tax rate is used as an instrumental variable. The results support 
the traditional view. The second essay focuses on whether the exemption of nonprofit 
organizations from the corporate income tax affects the competition between for-profit 
and nonprofit hospitals. Time series and panel data analysis show that tax subsidies to 
nonprofit organizations have a positive impact on nonprofit hospitals’ market share. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Corporate income tax rules in the United States are complicated and always 
controversial. Economic entities with different organizational forms are taxed differently. 
High corporate income tax rates drive corporations to convert into tax-exempted forms. 
Economists and policy makers are keen to find out how the relationship between various 
forms and tax rules influences the general economy and social welfare. Empirical 
research in this field can provide insights in economic modeling of income taxes and 
generate deep policy implications for corporate income tax reform.  
 One heatedly debated topic is whether the double taxation of dividends negatively 
affects investment in the corporate sector. Managers of profitable corporations have to 
decide whether to distribute those after-tax profits to shareholders as dividends or to 
retain the earnings to finance new investments. The traditional view holds that dividends 
have the extra function of profit signaling. Therefore, corporate managers tend to 
distribute more dividends than they would if dividends only served as a way of profit 
distribution. Thus corporations do not have adequate retained earnings to finance 
marginal investment and have to issue new shares to raise capital for new projects. The 
double taxation of dividends increases the cost of capital and thus reduces the overall 
investment level in the corporate sector. Therefore, supporters of the traditional view call 
for tax reforms to integrate the corporate income tax and personal income tax on 
dividends.  
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 However, the new view holds that dividends do not serve any extra function of 
profit signaling, so managers of profitable corporations always retain enough after-tax 
profits to finance marginal investment and distribute the residual profits to shareholders. 
Thus, dividends are distributed regardless of the tax cost, and double taxation of 
dividends does not negatively reduce the investment in corporate sector. Rather, firms 
distribute profits as dividends only if they have no more profitable investment 
opportunities; the tax is not foreclosing any profitable investments. Therefore, supporters 
of the new view object to a reform to eliminate tax on dividends, fearing such elimination 
would greatly reduce federal tax revenue.  
 A second controversial topic is the corporate income tax’s impact on for-profit 
and nonprofit organizations (NPOs). NPOs play an indispensable role in the United 
States. They provide goods and services to the society when the government fails to 
provide enough to its people. Researchers have been inquiring whether the government’s 
tax subsidies to the nonprofit organizations are important to their existence and to 
competition with for-profit counterparts. If they do not respond to the exemption of 
various taxes, then taxing them in the same way as for-profit organizations will both 
increase tax revenue and level the playing field. On the other hand, the proof of a positive 
relationship between tax exemption and nonprofit activities helps policy makers to 
determine the right measure to regulate NPOs in their desired direction. 
 This dissertation studies these two topics in two essays. The first essay explores 
the different tax treatment of C and S corporations and shows that the dividend payout 
ratios of C and S corporations should differ under the traditional view but not under the 
new view. Thus it examines the validity of the traditional and new views by comparing 
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the dividend payout ratios in C and S forms. Applying the test on a confidential tax return 
dataset provided by Georgia Department of Revenue, I find empirical results supporting 
the traditional view. The second essay focuses on the impact of federal corporate income 
tax exemption on the market shares of nonprofit hospitals. The study of national level and 
state level aggregate market shares provided in Hospital Statistics published by the 
American Hospital Association shows that the tax exemption does positively affect 
nonprofit hospitals’ market shares. 
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CHAPTER 2 
ESSAY ONE: THE IMPACT OF THE CORPORATE INCOME TAX 
ON THE COST OF CAPITAL—NEW EVIDENCE FROM CHOICE 
OF C VS. S CORPORATE FORMS 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 U.S. business and personal income tax rules subject corporate income first to the 
corporate income tax (CIT) at the corporate level and then to the personal income tax 
when dividends are distributed. If corporations do not distribute the profits as dividends, 
shareholders pay taxes on their capital gains when they sell their shares. Therefore, 
corporate income is taxed twice. Economists and policy makers are eager to find out 
whether this double taxation of dividends increases the cost of capital and distorts 
investment behavior in the corporate sector. Some scholars believe that it does and call 
for dividend tax cut, while others disagree. However, despite decades of debate, no 
agreement has been reached. Empirical research on this topic will not only contribute to 
the establishment of a correct theoretical framework, but also will have policy 
implications on tax reforms.  
 There are two competing views on the taxation of dividends. The traditional view 
argues that dividends are not only a way of distributing corporate profits to shareholders, 
but also have other utilities such as signaling profit to build up investors’ confidence and 
satisfying investors’ preference to have cash in their hands rather than in the corporations. 
Therefore, corporations have the tendency to distribute the profits to shareholders despite 
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the double taxation of dividends. However, the dividend tax increases the cost of profit 
signaling and decreases the rate of return of capital for corporate investors. As a result, it 
increases the cost of capital and lowers overall investment level in the corporate sector. 
Therefore its supporters have proposed the integration of corporate and personal income 
tax to reform the U.S. income tax system. Hubbard (1993) states that the U.S. Treasury 
holds the traditional view and advocates integration of corporate income tax and 
individual income tax on dividends.  
 However, the new view, proposed by King (1977) and Auerbach (1983a, 1983b) 
believes that mature firms only distribute dividends when they have retained enough 
earnings to finance the marginal investment and dividends are only the residuals of 
profits after retained earnings; these dividends are distributed anyway no matter how high 
the dividend tax is. Therefore dividend tax is neutral and does not affect corporations’ 
dividend distribution and investment behavior; thus integration of corporate income tax 
and individual income tax on dividends will not increase investment by much but will 
reduce federal tax revenue. Sinn (1991) states that the major reason Congress did not 
follow the Treasury Department proposal to integrate CIT and individual income tax in 
1986 was that it feared that the integration would substantially lower revenue without 
creating significant efficiency gains.  
 Each view is appealing under its assumption about the function of dividends, and 
it is not possible to judge the views’ validity by only looking at their theoretical 
frameworks; we have to resort to empirical evidence to determine which view is more 
correct. However, empirical analysis that tests these competing views is limited due to 
the lack of appropriate data.  
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 The comparison of dividend policy among different organizational forms may 
shed some light on how to test these competing theories. The S corporation, a relatively 
new but mushrooming organizational form, is different from the traditional corporation 
(which is hereafter called a C corporation), the noncorporate forms, and other hybrid 
forms. It enjoys the limited liability of a C corporation, which means that its shareholders 
only risk the amount of money they invest in the corporation rather than all of their 
wealth, but it is taxed similarly to a partnership, which means that it does not pay CIT 
and all its profits and losses are passed though to shareholders and are only subject to 
individual income tax. The comparison of dividend policy in S and C corporations 
provides a good test of competing views on taxation of dividends. 
 This paper focuses on C and S corporations and studies the impact of corporate 
income tax on investors’ choice between S and C forms by using individual firm-level 
time-series information from a confidential tax return dataset in Georgia. It first derives 
the cost of capital for C and S corporations under different views within the neoclassical 
economic framework. Then it tests the competing views about dividend taxation. If the 
traditional view more accurately reflects the fact than the new view, then the choice of an 
S or a C organizational form should affect the dividend payment and S corporations 
should pay a higher proportion of profits as dividends. However, if the new view is 
correct, then dividends are just the residual of corporations’ profits after new investment, 
and dividend payment is not affected by the organizational form. Thus, this paper tests 
the hypothesis that S corporations have higher dividend payout ratios than C corporations 
because they avoid the double taxation of corporate income.  
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 However, there is an endogeneity problem in that corporations with higher 
dividend payout ratios might select to be S corporations in order to avoid CIT. Thus 
instrumental variables are necessary. The literature has shown that average CIT rate 
affects organizational forms. Empirical analysis of the data provides evidence that the 
higher the effective CIT rate is, the more likely a corporation is to choose the S form in 
order to minimize income tax payment. Therefore, the average CIT rate in the preceding 
year is used as an instrumental variable. The final empirical results confirm the traditional 
view.  
 Following the logic in the above paragraph, section 2.2 reviews the literature 
about the competing views on the dividend taxation. Section 2.3 gives a comprehensive 
description of S corporations’ tax rules and history. Section 2.4 shows the theoretical 
framework using the cost of capital and sets up the hypothesis. Section 2.5 describes the 
data from the Georgia tax return files and the adjustments made to fit it for the analysis in 
this paper. Section 2.6 tests the hypothesis that organizational form affects dividend 
payout ratio and shows findings that S corporations pay higher proportion of profits as 
dividends. Due to the endogenous relationship between organizational forms and 
dividend payout ratio, average CIT rate is used as an instrumental variable. Section 2.7 
draws support from the literature, showing that average CIT rate affects the decision of 
organizational forms. Section 2.8 tests whether average tax rate affects the choice of 
organizational form in my data. Section 2.9 re-tests the relationship between 
organizational form and dividend payout ratio, correcting for the endogeneity problem 
and section 2.10 concludes this paper. 
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2.2 Literature Review 
 Different theories about dividend taxation provide different guidelines and 
evaluation of federal income tax reform. Numerous studies have examined why 
corporations pay dividends despite the tax penalties on dividends from the double 
taxation, but no consensus has emerged. The most influential theories are categorized into 
two groups: the traditional view and the new view. The literature is abundant with articles 
summarizing these theories and studies testing them (e.g., Poterba, 1987; Sorensen, 1995; 
and Carroll et al., 2003).  
 The dispute between the traditional and new views centers on the different 
assumptions about the function of dividends: whether dividends have more functions than 
that of distributing profits to shareholders. If dividends have more functions than serving 
as a means of profit distribution, as the traditional view assumes, then corporations will 
distribute a higher proportion of profits to shareholders and the remaining retained 
earnings will not be enough to finance new investments. According to the new view, 
mature corporations finance marginal investments from retained earnings; after they run 
out of investment opportunities, they distribute the remaining profits to shareholders as 
dividends. Scholars on both sides use the neoclassical economic framework of user cost 
of capital initiated by Jorgenson (1963) and Hall and Jorgenson (1967) to explain and 
justify their arguments. The user cost of capital is defined as the required rate of return on 
the capital investment; the higher the cost, the lower the capital investment and the 
smaller the capital stock in the corporate sector. Supporters of the traditional view believe 
that the double taxation of dividends increases the cost of capital, while the new view 
supporters believe that it does not. 
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 The discussion of the traditional and new views is limited to mature firms, which 
are defined as firms to having limited investment opportunities so that their profits are 
high enough to cover all those opportunities. However, this definition does not explicitly 
include growing corporations that do not have enough profits to finance their desired 
investment. To make up this gap, Sinn (1991) follows the line of argument used by the 
new view and proposes the nucleus theory that growing corporations are established with 
limited initial capital but are expanded through retained earnings. No dividend is 
distributed before corporations reach the mature phase. After entering the mature phase, 
corporations distribute dividend out of the profit that remains after the firms deplete all of 
the investment opportunities, as predicted by the new view. 
 Empirical tests of the two views are limited and the results are mixed. There were 
six influential empirical studies in the 1980s by Gordon and Bradford (1980), Poterba and 
Summers (1984), Poterba (1987), Nadeau (1988), Auerbach (1984), and Bagwell and 
Shoven (1989). However their conclusions are mixed, with some supporting the 
traditional view and others supporting the new view. Moreover each study is flawed, with 
some dubious results or interpretation (Zodrow, 1991).  
 Two additional studies were done in 1994 and 2000. Gentry (1994) exploits the 
different tax treatment of publicly traded partnerships (PTP) and corporations and uses 
firm-level data to study the relationship between the dividend payout ratio and PTP 
versus corporation forms. He argues that the tax cost of dividends is lower for PTP firms 
than for corporations. According to the nucleus theory and the new view, dividend 
payment is not affected by dividend tax cost because dividend is paid only as remaining 
profit after the corporations deplete their investment opportunities. However, the 
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traditional view predicts that dividend payout ratio is affected by the cost of dividend tax. 
His result shows that PTP firms pay a significantly higher proportion of their profits as 
dividends than corporations so that the traditional view is more likely to be correct. 
Gentry (1994) explains that dividend payout ratio should differ for PTPs and corporations 
under the traditional view because the cost of signaling of dividend is lower for PTP than 
corporations. However, his explanation is more intuitive than theoretically sound and 
more rigorous proof is necessary. 
 In 1987, Australia and New Zealand adopted similar dividend imputation systems 
to allow dividend taxes on the personal level to be offset by some credits derived from 
corporations’ CIT payment. The new dividend imputation systems reduced the tax cost of 
dividends and are expected to increase capital investment under the traditional view but 
to have no significant impact under the new view. Black, Legoria and Sellers (2000) find 
evidence that dividend imputation increases corporate capital investment, supporting the 
traditional view. 
  More empirical evidence using different methodology is necessary to test the 
validity of the traditional and new views. The difference of C and S forms provides 
another angle to examine the theories and design an empirical test. This paper compares 
the dividend payout ratios in C and S corporations to test the competing views.  
2.3 A Brief Introduction of S Corporations 
 In the United States, economic entities take various organizational forms, 
including corporations, typical noncorporate entities (i.e., sole proprietorships and 
partnerships), and hybrids of noncorporate and corporate forms, (e.g., publicly traded 
partnerships). Congress created the S corporation in 1958. According to U.S. Code (1958, 
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page 4876), Congress believed that it “is desirable to permit businesses to select the form 
of business organization desired, without the necessity of taking into account major 
differences in tax consequence. . . . Also, permitting shareholders to report their 
proportionate share of the corporate income, in lieu of a corporate tax, will be a 
substantial aid to small business. . . . The provision will also be of substantial benefit to 
small corporations realizing losses for a period of years where there is no way of 
offsetting these losses against taxable income at the corporate level, but the shareholders 
involved have other income which can be offset against these losses.”  
 Therefore, Congress enacted the Technical Amendments Act of 1958, requiring 
the IRS to give small businesses an option to choose whether to have their net business 
income exempted from the CIT. According to IRS regulations, an S corporation begins 
its existence as a general for-profit corporation upon filing the articles of incorporation at 
the state level. However, after the corporation has been formed, it may elect “S 
Corporation Status” by submitting IRS form 2553 to the Internal Revenue Service. Once 
this filing is complete, the IRS refers to the business as an S corporation Corporations 
which do not file IRS form 2553 are referred as C corporations. An S corporation is taxed 
similarly to a partnership rather than as a C corporation. Thus, its net income or loss is 
passed through to its shareholders for the purpose of computing tax liability. Net income, 
whether the corporation actually distributes it or not, is passed through to the 
shareholders and taxed based on their personal income tax rates. Losses are passed 
through to shareholders who can use it to offset personal income from other sources. In 
certain circumstances, the S form saves more money in taxes than the C form for 
businesses with profits or losses. However, Congress set several requirements for small 
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corporations to qualify as S corporations. Those major requirements included the 
following: 
 —The corporation can have no more than 10 shareholders. 
 —All shareholders must be either U.S. citizens or permanent resident aliens, and 
non-resident aliens are not acceptable.  
 —The corporation must have issued only one class of stock. 
 —No more than 80% of its gross receipts can be from sources outside the Untied 
States. 
 —No more than 20% of the corporation's gross receipts can be derived from 
passive investment activities. 
  However, S corporations were not taxed in the same way as partnerships at that 
time because S corporation shareholders were not allowed to carry losses over, while 
partnership shareholders were. The Subchapter S Revision Act of 1982 increased the 
maximum number of shareholders to 35, eliminated the requirement of no more than 80% 
of gross receipts from abroad, and mandated that S corporations be taxed in the same way 
as partnerships. The S form started to be a real option for small businesses. 
 The S form has benefits over the C form in various circumstances. Scholes et al. 
(2002) created a simple example to illustrate that the double taxation of the corporate 
income means that a dividend-paying C corporation must pay a higher before-tax rate of 
return than a similar S corporation. The longer the time span of the investment, the lower 
the difference in required rates of return; but a difference persists even when the time 
span increases to fifty years. 
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 However, Hulse and Pope (1996) argue that if both C and S corporations do not 
pay any dividend and use all of their profits to finance similar new projects, then C 
shareholders will pay less income tax than S shareholders. Their argument is true in the 
years when the CIT rate is lower than individual income tax rate. Even though C 
shareholders are taxed by capital gain tax when they sell their shares years later, they still 
pay a combined income tax less than S shareholders because the capital gain tax rate is 
low compared with the individual tax rate and is taxed only on the realization date, which 
means that its accrual rate (i.e., its yearly equivalent rate) is negligible. For example, 
taxing the income from selling currently held stocks in ten years with the capital gain tax 
rate of 28% is equivalent to taxing the income with a rate of 1.4% every year ([1-
0.28]=[1-accrual rate]10). If the CIT rate is 35% and the individual income tax rate is 
39%, then C shareholders combined yearly income tax rate is 36% (=1-[1-0.35]*[1-
0.014]), while the S shareholders yearly income tax rate is 39%. However, with the Jobs 
and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, which cuts the top tax rate on 
dividends from 35% to 15%, Hulse and Pope’s argument becomes weak. 
 Plesko (1995) explains the tax advantage of the S form for corporations bearing 
losses. He argues that immediate use of the loss to offset individual income tax payments 
yields a higher present value of tax savings than the C form, which has to carry losses 
forward to offset future profits in the corporation. Also, if the shareholders’ personal tax 
rate is higher than the firms’ corporate income tax rate, losses passed through to the 
shareholders could offset a greater amount of tax liability at the individual level than at 
the corporate level, even without present value considerations.  
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 Despite the theoretical expectation of tax advantages for the S form and policy 
makers’ intentions to favor small business by creating the S form, not many corporations 
took the S form in the early 1980s because there were a lot of tax loopholes sheltering C 
corporations’ income, which made the S form less attractive than the congressmen had 
desired. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86) eliminated a lot of loopholes that allowed 
C corporations to avoid CIT payments and stimulated the expansion of the S form 
further, making it more important in the economy. For example, TRA86 set up the 
Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT), so that corporations could no longer avoid tax 
payment through the tax shelters of debt financing and accelerated depreciation. The 
AMT calculates taxable income differently than the CIT, adding back part of the benefit 
of accelerated depreciation and other tax-reducing items. Those other tax-reducing items 
include some interest receipts from tax-exempt municipal securities and taxes deferred by 
use of completed contract accounting. (The completed contract method allows a 
manufacturer to postpone reporting taxable profits until a production contract is 
completed. Since contracts may span several years, this deferral can have a substantial 
positive net present value. [Brealey & Myers, 1991, p. 732]) Then the AMT equals 20 
percent of the AMT taxable income. Because the AMT makes the corporation income tax 
an effective burden for corporations, it made the S form more attractive.  
 In 1996, Congress believed that “increasing the maximum number of shareholders 
of an S corporation will facilitate corporate ownership by additional family members, 
employees and capital investors” (US Code 1996, p. 1519). Thus, it increased the 
maximum number of shareholders from 35 to 75 in the Small Business Job Protection 
Act. The law also removed barriers preventing banks from organizing as S corporations.  
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 According to Plesko (1994), S corporations accounted for less than 20% of all 
corporations, less than 2% of all corporate assets, and about 5% of corporate business 
receipts prior to 1986. In 1989, those percentages increased to 39% of corporations, 3.9% 
of assets, and 13% of business receipts. In 1996, 58.2% of corporations in the US were S 
corporations, with 18.6% of total receipts and 3.8% of total assets. (Bennett, 2001). The 
prevalence of the S form and the difference of its tax treatment from that of the C form 
provide a test of the dividend taxation theories. 
2.4 Methodology: Cost of Capital and C versus S Corporations 
 The most prominent work summarizing the traditional and new views is done by 
Poterba and Summers (1984). In order to apply their framework in the C and S forms 
scenario, I reiterate their mathematical derivations briefly here. They set a profit-
maximizing firm’s objective function as maximizing the present value of after-personal-
income-tax dividend income minus reinvestment,  
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where  
m = shareholder’s effective tax rate on dividend 
τ = effective corporate income tax rate 
z = shareholder’s accrual capital gain tax rate 
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ρ = shareholder’s required rate of return 
Dt = dividend at time t. Dt≥0  
VNt = new share issued at time t 
Kt = capital stock at time t 
It = capital investment at time t 
π( ) = pretax profitability function 
N
V  = minimum level of new share issues. 0≤NV when it is less than zero, it indicates 
share repurchase. 
NN VV ≥  
μ, λ, η, and ξ = Lagrange multipliers 
 Holders of the traditional view believe that dividends offer extra benefits such as 
signaling profitability that outweigh their tax disadvantages so that corporations distribute 
them despite the double taxation. Therefore, shareholders’ required rate of return is a 
function of dividend payout ratio—α: 
( ) ( )tt
t
t
D αρπτρρ =⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−=+ 11  
 where ρ' < 0, which means the higher the dividend payout ratio, the lower rate of return 
shareholders request. 
 Manipulation of first order conditions (as shown on page 21 of Poterba and 
Summers’s paper) gives the user cost of capital under the traditional view:  
( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ]zmKc −−+−−== 1111)(' αατ
ρπ
 
 The math formula of the user cost of capital shows that dividends are doubly 
taxed because both the corporate income tax rate, τ, and the individual income tax rate, m, 
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appear in the denominator. The double taxation of dividends increases the cost of capital 
in the corporate sector. Correspondingly, shareholders require that the return from 
marginal investment be high enough to cover the tax loss from the double taxation. Thus, 
dividend taxation increases the cost of capital, lowers investors’ incentive, and reduces 
corporate capital accumulation, and therefore dividend taxation should be reformed 
through the integration of CIT and personal income tax.  
 However, the holders of the new view believe that dividends offer no extra 
benefits but are only a means of distributing profits to shareholders. Thus, the 
shareholders’ required rate of return is irrelevant to the dividend payout ratio. 
Manipulation of the first order conditions with the assumptions under the new view (as 
shown on page 11 of Poterba and Summers’s 1984 paper) gives the user cost of capital 
under the new view: 
( )( )zKc −−== 11)(' τ
ρπ
 
 The individual income tax rate, m, does not appear in the denominator and 
dividends are taxed only once if we ignore the negligible capital gain taxation. Therefore, 
the user cost of capital under the new view is lower than that under the traditional view. 
The holders of the new view believe that the old view exaggerates the distortion; they 
worry that integrating the corporate and personal income taxes will significantly reduce 
government tax revenues without increasing the incentive to invest by much.  
 No work has been done to relate the dispute between the traditional and new 
views to the C versus S forms and to derive the cost of capital for S firms. The cost of 
capital for S corporations can be easily derived using the same framework as Poterba and 
Summers (1984). The maximization function for the S corporation shareholders is 
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different from that for the C corporation shareholders. Shareholders of S corporations 
firms receive their return to investment through dividends and appreciated equity value; 
however, no matter what proportion of profit is distributed as dividends, all the profit is 
subject to personal income tax. Because all the profit has been taxed by the personal 
income tax, dividends are “tax-free.” However, when shareholders receive income by 
trading shares or by dissolving the corporation, that income is subject to capital gain tax. 
Therefore, their shareholders’ rate of return is 
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Solving the value equation forward and assuming the transversality condition, 
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Maximizing the current value subject to four conditions—capital accumulation, cash flow 
equality, minimum new share issues requirement, and minimum dividend distribution 
requirement, we have the Lagrange function: 
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Using derivation similar to the work of Poterba and Summers (1984) as follows leads to 
the user cost of capital functions under the new view and traditional view, respectively. 
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 The same as the traditional view in the C corporation scenario above, 
shareholders’ required rate of return is a function of the dividend payout ratio—α: 
( ) ( ) ( )ttt
t
t Km
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⎛
−=+ 11 ,  
where ρ' < 0, which means the higher the dividend payout ratio, the lower the rate of 
return shareholders request. In equilibrium, ρt = ρt+1. 
 First order conditions give the following equations: 
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 The traditional view assumes corporations will distribute too many dividends 
despite the dividend tax and not accumulate enough internal funds for new investment 
opportunities; therefore, corporations will have to issue new shares to finance new 
investments. Thus 
NN VV > which leads to 0=tη  and 1−=tμ . Therefore, 1=tλ  which is 
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a constant and leads to 1+= tt λλ . Also, because corporations distribute dividends, 0>tD  
and thus 0=tξ .  
 Further manipulation of first order condition of K gives  
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where the last approximation comes from Taylor’s expansion. Thus, the user cost of 
capital under the traditional view is  
( )( )zzmKc α
ρπ +−−== 11)(' . 
 However, the holders of the new view believe that dividends offer no extra 
benefits but are only the means of distributing profits to shareholders. The shareholders’ 
required rate of return is irrelevant to the dividend payout ratio. The first order conditions 
become 
It: 0=+ tt μλ  
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 As there is no non-tax benefit of dividends, mature corporations—those whose 
retained earnings are enough to finance their limited investment opportunities—always 
finance new investment through retained earnings and distribute the remaining profits to 
shareholders. Thus 0>tD , which leads to 0=tξ  and 
ztt −=−= 1
1μλ . Obviously, tλ  is 
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constant if accrual capital gain tax rate does not change and thus 1+= tt λλ . Further 
manipulation of the first order condition of K gives  
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, 
where the last approximation comes from Taylor’s expansion. Thus, the user cost of 
capital under the new view is 
( )( )zmKc t −−== 11)('
ρπ
. 
 
Table 2.1: Comparison of Cost of Capital under Different Views for Different Forms 
 C corporations S corporations 
Traditional 
view 
( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ]zmKc −−+−−== 1111)(' αατ
ρπ ( )( )zzmKc α
ρπ +−−== 11)('
New view 
( )( )zKc −−== 11)(' τ
ρπ
 ( )( )zmKc t −−== 11)('
ρπ  
  
 For ease of comparison, Table 2.1 puts together the cost of capital under two 
different views for two types of corporations. For C corporations, the cost of capital 
under the traditional view is higher than that under the new view, as long as C 
corporations pay dividends (i.e., α > 0); on the other hand, for S corporations, the cost of 
capital under the traditional view is lower than that under the new view. Two reasons 
account for the difference. First, dividends to S corporations’ shareholders are tax-free, 
but capital gain is not. If S corporations save excessive profits without distributing them, 
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shareholders will have to pay capital gain tax when they either trade their shares or 
liquidate the business. Second, under the traditional view, dividends distribution provides 
more benefit than only that of distributing profits. This unmeasured benefit helps reduce 
the cost of capital. Therefore, the best dividend policy for S corporations under the 
traditional view is to distribute all the profits to shareholders and issue new shares to 
finance marginal investment. However, because the accrual capital gain tax rate is 
negligible, the cost of capital does not differ much from one view to the other.  
 Figure 2.1 illustrates demand and supply of corporations’ capital stock if we can 
assume that the marginal corporate income tax rate, the marginal individual income tax 
rate, and the capital gain rate are fixed. Figure 2.1a illustrates the demand and supply for 
C corporations. Curve ab represents the demand for capital; each point on it stands for the 
marginal rate of return of the investment. Line cd represents the cost of capital under the 
traditional view and line ef represents the cost of capital under the new view. To 
maximize their profits, corporations keep investing until capital’s rate of return equals the 
cost of financing. Obviously, under the traditional view, the double taxation of dividends 
imposes a larger dead weight loss and reduces overall capital stock in the corporate 
sector. Similarly, Figure 2.1b illustrates the demand and supply for S corporations. The 
cost of capital under the traditional view, c'd', is lower than the cost of capital under the 
new view, e'f'. However they are very close to each other. 
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Figure 2.1: Cost of Investment Financing 
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Figure 2.1b: traditional versus new views under S corporations’ scenario
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Figure 2.1a: traditional versus new views under C corporations’ scenario 
Cost of financing with retained 
earnings (new view) 
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 An important finding from table 2.1 is that the dividend payout ratio, α, appears in 
both formulas for C and S corporations under the traditional view; however, higher 
payout ratios increase the cost of capital for C corporations but lower the cost of capital 
for S corporations. Nevertheless, α does not appear in both cost formulas under the new 
view. If we take it for granted that investors always choose to have the lowest cost of 
capital, this comparison of cost formulas provides a test on the two views. If the 
traditional view is correct, then S corporations will distribute a significantly higher 
proportion of profits as dividends than C corporations. However, if the new view is 
correct, then dividend payout ratio is irrelevant to the cost of capital and we cannot 
observe any difference in dividend payout ratio between C and S corporations. Thus, I set 
up my first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: S corporations pay higher percentage of profit as dividend than C 
corporations. 
OLS regressions of dividend payout ratio on organizational forms can directly test 
this hypothesis. However, organizational form may be endogenous to dividend payout 
ratio because firms that pay a higher proportion of their profits as dividends might select 
the S form. An instrumental variable for the organizational form is necessary for unbiased 
estimation. I will use each firm’s average CIT rate in the preceding year as an instrument. 
User cost of capital formulas in table 2.1 show that under the traditional view or the new 
view, the cost of capital for S corporations can be higher or lower than that for C 
corporations, depending on the corporate income tax rate τ and the personal income tax 
rate m. However, one thing is clear—that the higher the corporate income tax rate, τ, the 
more likely that the cost of capital for C corporations is higher than that for S 
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corporations. If the cost of capital for the C corporations is higher than that for the S 
corporations, C corporations will elect the S status; otherwise, they will remain in the C 
form. Thus I set up my second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: A high average CIT rate causes corporations to take the S form.  
If hypothesis 2 is proven to be correct, then I will use it as an instrumental 
variable for organizational forms and use instrumental variable method to test hypothesis 
1, presuming CIT rate is not related to dividend payout ratio. 
2.5 Data 
I will use confidential Georgia Tax Return data provided by the Georgia 
Department of Revenue. Corporations that own property or do business in Georgia are 
subject to the state corporate income tax and net worth tax. The Department of Revenue 
uses shares of sale receipts, property values, and compensation in Georgia to calculate the 
apportionment ratio, which determines what percentage of the nationwide corporate 
income is subject to state corporate income tax. (See Edmiston [1996] for a detailed 
description of the apportionment formula.) Georgia also imposes a net worth tax on the 
equity of corporations. For U.S. corporations, all equity in the United States is taxed; 
however, for foreign corporations, only the equity in Georgia is taxed. (See Grace [2002] 
for a description of the net worth tax in Georgia.) C corporations file the Georgia Form 
600 Corporation Tax Return, reporting federal taxable income, sales receipts, 
compensation, property value within Georgia and the United States, and equity value. S 
corporations file Georgia Form 600S Corporation Tax Return. Even though the IRS 
exempts S corporations from federal corporate income tax, Georgia does not recognize 
the S status. Therefore, instead of reporting federal taxable income as C corporations do, 
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S corporations report federal ordinary income, together with net worth, sale receipts, 
compensation, and property values in Form 600S. Unfortunately, the Georgia Department 
of Revenue does not provide complete information regarding S corporations, so I only 
know their ordinary federal income and net worth but do not have information about sales 
receipts, compensation, and property values.  
My dataset includes all the corporations doing business in Georgia between 1990 
and 1999. The tax laws on CIT were relatively stable in this period. The tax reform acts 
in 1993 and 1997 did not make large changes in corporation income taxation and made 
negligible changes in non-tax restrictions on the conversion from C into S. Therefore, 
investors’ decisions on what organizational forms to elect were purely determined by the 
tax rates, which change due to economic fluctuation and different phases in the business 
cycles of individual firms.  
The tax data does not provide the dividend payout ratio directly; however, it 
provides net worth tax information. We can use the net worth to find the dividend payout 
ratio. The net worth is defined as the sum of total capital stock, paid in or capital surplus 
(i.e., shareholders’ overpayment to the corporation when they purchase the shares), and 
retained earnings. The increase of net worth from the previous year to the current year is 
a good proxy of net earnings retained in current year; given that corporations earn profits 
in the current year. Subsequently, corporations’ after-tax profits minus the amount of 
earnings retained are the paid-out dividends, and dividends divided by the after-tax 
profits give the dividend payout ratio of interest. The other variables used in the analysis 
include equity, before-tax earnings, and age. Because I needed two consecutive years to 
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figure out the dividend payout ratio, I used the average equity and average before-tax 
earnings in the two years. 
An initial check of the dataset showed that a portion of the C corporations had 
foreign shareholders; a small number of corporations filed both 600 and 600S tax forms 
in the same year or switched between the forms more than once within five years; a 
fractional percentage of corporations either had one year tax information missing or had 
several records in one single year. As the IRS does not allow S corporations to have 
foreign shareholders and forbids corporations to switch back and forth within five years, I 
excluded those corporations with foreign shareholders and those that switched several 
times within five years. As I needed continuous years’ information to derive the dividend, 
I excluded corporations with one tax year’s record missing or with several records for a 
single year. 
After the initial data-cleaning work, I made two important adjustments to fit the 
data to my analytical framework. First, this paper studies the dividend policy of 
comparable C and S corporations and the conversion from the C form into the S form. 
Ideally, I should screen all the C corporations in the sample and filter out those C 
corporations which do not meet the IRS requirements for the S form stated in the earlier 
section. However, there is no information about the corporations’ shareholders in the tax 
forms. Nevertheless, I believe that eligible C corporations (even though they did not 
convert into the S form) should have an equity size similar to those S corporations, 
because C corporations with too large a size usually have too many shareholders and are 
not eligible to convert into the S form. Therefore, I limited my pool of C corporations to 
those whose equity size does not exceed $5,774,859, the 99th percentile of equity size of 
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S corporations. The reason that I do not set the criterion to be the maximum equity size of 
S corporations is that corporations with the maximum equity might be an outliers due to 
inputting errors.  
Second, the theoretical discussion in this paper focuses on profit-making 
corporations. However, the S form is also attractive to investors in loss-bearing 
corporations because S shareholders can use the loss to offset their individual income, 
whereas C shareholders cannot (Plesko, 1995). Furthermore, this paper tests the theories 
on dividend taxation, which concerns how corporations deal with profits rather than 
losses. Therefore, the regression is limited to corporations with positive net earnings.  
Table 2.2 lists the means and standard deviations of variables in the final sample. 
There are over ten times as many S corporations as C corporations in the sample, which 
indicates that the S form dominates among small corporations. Apparently, C 
corporations on average distribute 33% of their profits as dividends compared with the 
67% dividend payout ratio among S corporations. Also, C corporations have larger equity 
size, earn more profits, and have a little longer history than S corporations. However, the 
standard deviations of those variables are very large, indicating large variation among 
each group. 
Table 2.2: Mean and Standard Deviation of Variables in the Sample 
N dividend 
payout ratio 
equity 
($K) 
profits 
($K) 
age 
(year) 
average 
CIT rate 
C corporations 
5784 33% 235 749 10 23%
 (34%) (535) (776) (9) (20%)
S corporations 
63044 67% 184 109 8 . 
 (33%) (568) (388) (8) . 
Note: Standard deviations are in the parentheses. 
 29
2.6 Findings: Dividend Payout Ratio and C versus S Forms 
The difference between C and S forms provides a good chance to examine the 
validity of the different views. If the new view and the nucleus theory are correct then 
corporations will always finance their new investment through retained earnings as long 
as the CIT rate is lower than the personal income tax rate; dividend payout is the residual 
of net earnings subtract retained earnings and is paid out regardless of the tax cost. 
Therefore, there should be no significant difference in dividend payout across the forms. 
On the other hand, if the traditional view is correct, then we should observe a higher 
payout ratio for S corporations than C corporations. 
I used OLS regression to test the traditional versus the new view. The regression 
takes the following form: 
AgeEarningEquitydummySratioDiv ×+×+×+×+= 43210 )ln()ln(__ βββββ  
where Div_ratio stands for the dividend payout ratio.  
 I took the log transformation of both equity and earning in order to downsize their 
scales and normalize them. Another benefit of log transformation is that it makes the 
explanation of the coefficients more sensible in that the coefficients show the change of 
dividend payout ratio in terms of percentage points in response to percentage change of 
equity and earnings. 
Depending on the information available in my sample, the other control variables 
include age, the log function of two years average of equity, and the log function of two 
years average of before-tax net earnings. I expected age to have a positive impact on 
dividend payout ratio because mature firms have limited investment opportunities and are 
more likely to distribute net earnings as dividends. I expected before-tax net earnings to 
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have a positive effect on dividend payout ratio because the remaining net earnings minus 
further investment over net earnings is an increasing function of net earnings. The impact 
of equity is expected to be negative because large corporations are expected to have more 
investment opportunities and will retain more profits. 
There are three regression models on three different samples. The first regression 
analyzes the dividend payout ratio difference before and after a C corporation converted 
into the S form. For example, assume a corporation exists in periods one through six. It 
elects C status in periods one through three and changes to S status in period four and 
remains there through period six. I use the tax information in periods one and two to 
calculate the dividend payout ratio before conversion and the information in periods five 
and six for the payout ratio after conversion. I do not use information in periods three and 
four because tax information in transition periods might not be reliable. Similarly, the 
second regression analyzes the difference before and after an S corporation converted 
into the C form. The third one makes horizontal comparisons on C and S corporations in 
the same year to see if S corporations distribute a higher portion of profits than 
comparable C corporations, given their size, earning and age controlled.  
I ran the regressions on corporations which have positive earnings and distribute 
no more than their total net earnings. There are a few corporations distributing dividend 
despite negative net earnings or decreasing equity despite positive net earnings. However, 
these firms are irrelevant to the study of the relationship between organizational forms 
and dividend policy because according to IRS rules, distribution in case of loss in the 
current year and extra distribution exceeding current year earnings are treated as “return 
of capital” which is not taxed (Scholes et al. 2005, p. 352). Therefore, I exclude them 
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from the sample. Table 2.3 summarizes the regression results. Models 1 and 2 make 
vertical comparisons of the dividend payout ratio before and after the conversion. Model 
1 is for those C corporations which converted into the S form and model 2 is for those S 
corporations which converted into the C form. Model 3 makes a horizontal comparison of 
dividend payout ratio among comparable C and S corporations. Model 4 also makes 
horizontal comparisons, as model 3 does, but adds additional year dummy variables in 
the regression in an attempt to control the specific time effect of each year, using 1998 as 
the control year. However, those yearly dummy variables hardly add any more 
information in the explanation of corporations’ dividend payout ratio as the R square does 
not increase in model 4 and there is little difference between coefficients in model 3 and 
model 4.  
Across the models, the coefficient of the S status dummy variable is significantly 
positive, which suggests that S corporations pay out a higher proportion of profits as 
dividend than C corporations. As shown in model 1, after those C corporations convert 
into the S form, they pay 30.7% more of their profits as dividends than they did before 
the conversion. Similarly, model 2 shows that after those S corporations convert into the 
C form, they pay 24.0% less of their profits as dividends than they did before the 
conversion. The coefficient of the S dummy in model 3 is interpreted as showing that S 
corporations are expected to distribute 23.0% more of their profits than comparable C 
corporations. These results conform to the prediction of traditional view that dividend 
payment is influenced by the cost of dividend tax.  
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Table 2.3: OLS Regression Results on Dividend Payout Ratio 
Dependent variable: 
dividend payout ratio 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept 0.507*** 0.416 0.241*** 0.248*** 
 (0.080) (0.314) (0.007) (0.008) 
S dummy 0.307*** 0.240** 0.230*** 0.227*** 
 (0.024) (0.084) (0.004) (0.004) 
Ln(equity) -0.063*** -0.058*** -0.054*** -0.055*** 
 (0.004) (0.012) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ln(earning) 0.041*** 0.047 0.065*** 0.065*** 
 (0.009) (0.035) (0.001) (0.001) 
Age 0.005** -0.001 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 (0.001) (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) 
Year 1991    -0.017** 
    (0.006) 
Year 1992    -0.010 
    (0.005) 
Year 1993    -0.017** 
    (0.005) 
Year 1994    -0.005 
    (0.005) 
Year 1995    -0.005 
    (0.005) 
Year 1996    0.003 
    (0.004) 
Year 1997    0.018*** 
    (0.005) 
Adjusted R Square 0.42 0.39 0.39 0.39 
N 597 54 68828 68828 
Note:  
*significant at 5%; **significant at 1%; ***significant at 0.1% 
Standard deviations are below the estimated coefficients. 
Model 1: compares dividend payout ratio before and after C corporations converted into S. 
Model 2: compares dividend payout ratio before and after S Corporations converted into C. 
Model 3: compares dividend payout ratio of C and S corporations. 
Model 4: compares dividend payout ratio of C and S corporations with additional yearly 
dummies in the independent variable list; 1998 is the control year. 
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The equity size has a significant negative impact, which means that large firms 
tend to distribute lower proportion of earnings. For example, the coefficient of log equity 
in model 3 means that as equity size increases by 1%, corporations distribute 0.054% less 
of their profits. The effects of earnings and age are significantly positive, implying that 
older and more profitable firms are more likely to distribute higher proportions of profits. 
More specifically, model 3 shows that as profits increase by 1%, the dividend payout 
ratio tends to increase by 0.065 percentage points; as age increases by additional year, 
dividend payout ratio tends to increase by 0.2 percentage points. 
2.7 CIT Rate and the Choice of the C versus S Forms 
 The dividend payout ratio regression results shown in Table 2.3 seem to support 
the traditional view on dividend taxation. However, those regression estimates are biased 
due to endogeneity because corporations that want to distribute more dividends will 
select the S form. An instrumental variable which is related to organizational form but 
unrelated to dividend payout ratio in theory is necessary for unbiased estimation. 
However, despite the rapid expansion of the S form since the end of the 1980s, very little 
empirical research has been done on the choice between C and S corporation form due to 
the lack of appropriate data. The primary research interest focuses on how various 
financial characteristics such as leverage ratio and Net Operating Loss (NOL) are related 
to the choice of S versus C organizational form. Even though some of them are flawed by 
defective research designs, the general results are that corporations respond to different 
tax treatment by selecting different organizational forms.  
 Plesko (1994) takes a sample of newly incorporated C and S corporations in 1983 
which met the S form requirements from the 1984 Statistics of Income corporation file. 
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He compares the financial characteristics of S and C corporations to find which financial 
characteristics affect a firm’s decision to choose the C rather than the S form. His results 
show that larger, more profitable firms with higher compensation, fewer retained 
earnings, and lower debt-to-asset ratio are more likely to be C corporations. However, 
some of the results are counterintuitive. First, firms with higher debt-to-asset ratios 
should choose to be C corporations because high leverage provides an interest shield to 
reduce CIT (interest payments are deductible from corporate taxable income) and should 
reduce the incentive to choose the S form. Second, fewer retained earnings implies higher 
dividend distribution and more double taxation, which should be associated with a higher 
probability of choosing the S form. As Plesko himself points out, there is an endogeneity 
problem with his analysis because he analyzes the impact of those characteristics 
conditional on the corporations’ already having chosen their organizational forms. The 
choice of C versus S forms might have already had an impact on the financial 
characteristics. 
 Ayers et al. (1996) examine a sample of firms from the National Survey of Small 
Business Finances conducted in 1988 and 1989. Their sample includes partnerships and 
sole proprietorships, as well as C and S corporations. They apply multinomial logistic 
regression to examine the impact of certain characteristics on organizational form. Their 
results suggest that if we only compare C and S corporations, corporations with higher 
losses and higher corporation tax payments (if they have chosen to be C corporations) are 
more likely to be S corporations. Their explanation is that loss could help shareholders to 
offset their other personal income, so corporations with higher losses will choose the S 
form; and if potential CIT payments are low, the corporate income will be taxed at a 
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lower CIT rate rather than the maximum personal income tax rate, so shareholders will 
choose to hide their profit in C corporations. However, their analysis is also troubled with 
the endogeneity problem and their findings should be viewed with caution.  
 To avoid the endogeneity problem, some scholars rely on the times when tax rules 
change and collect information before and after the change. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 
(TRA86) provided a good chance for analysis. Plesko (1995) collects a sample of C 
corporations eligible to convert into S in 1986 and examines the impact of certain 
corporation characteristics on the decision to convert between 1986 and 1988. His 
variables capture a number of financial and legal factors, including gross corporate tax 
payment, undistributed income, interest paid, and carryover tax attributes. His regression 
results are consistent with the expectation that tax shields reduce the incentive to convert 
into the S form. In particular, debt has a negative impact on the conversion from C to S 
(contradictory to his 1994 finding).  
 Before 1986, there was a loophole that C corporations could purchase capital 
assets with retained earnings, use the cost of purchase to deduct corporate taxable 
income, and sell those assets after they elected the S status later so that they could avoid 
CIT. Then the IRS created a built-in-gain tax which taxes the sales of capital assets if S 
corporations sell the assets within a certain period of time after conversion. Omer, Plesko 
and Shelley (2000) focus on a sub-sample of firms in the natural resource industry from 
the same data as in Plesko (1995) did to examine the impact of such built-in-gain tax on 
the decision of C to S conversion. They conclude that the potential for built-in-gain 
realization significantly reduces the probability of converting from the C into the S form, 
conforming to their predictions. 
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 The Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996 allowed banks to convert to S 
corporations for the first time. Hodder et al. (2003) use logit regression on a series of 
banks’ tax-relevant variables before the allowed conversion date to see whether banks 
made a conversion between 1996 and 1998. Consistent with the tax incentive theory, they 
find that banks are more likely to convert when conversion saves dividend taxes, avoids 
alternative minimum taxes, and minimizes state income taxes, and they are less likely to 
convert when conversion nullifies Net Operating Loss carry-forwards and creates 
potential penalty taxes on unrealized gains existing at the conversion date. 
 In spite of inherent defects in some of the research, the general finding conforms 
to the theoretical prediction that shareholders respond to corporate income tax and choose 
to elect the S status in order to pay fewer taxes. Therefore, the literature supports the 
argument that corporations with a higher CIT rate are more likely to elect the S form. If I 
can prove the relationship between CIT rate and organizational forms with my data, I can 
use CIT rate as an instrumental variable for unbiased regression of dividend payout ratio, 
presuming that CIT rate is not correlated with dividend payout ratio. 
2.8 Findings: CIT and C versus S Forms 
Investors who maximize economic profit from investment will choose the 
appropriate form to minimize their cost of capital. Hypothesis 2 states that C corporations 
with higher CIT rates will choose the S form because the CIT increases the cost of capital 
for C corporations but not S corporations. To test this hypothesis, it seems that we can 
simply run a logistic regression on a pool of corporations including both C and S forms, 
with whether a corporation elects S form as the dependent variable and the CIT rate as 
one of the independent variables. If the firm was an S corporation in the preceding 
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period, then the CIT rate is the rate if it would have taken the C form. However, such 
regression suffers from an endogeneity problem because CIT rates (potential for S 
corporations) depend on the forms. For example, the potential CIT rate for an S 
corporation might be higher than the CIT rate would have been had the business been a C 
corporation because there is less incentive for the S corporation to take various strategies 
to shields its income from CIT. We can circumvent this endogeneity problem by looking 
at the decision on the conversion from C into S form. Thus the statement of hypothesis 2 
(on p. 24) becomes: 
Hypothesis 2a: A high average CIT rate causes C corporations to convert into the 
S form.  
It can be tested with a logistic model with the CIT rate and other financial 
variables as regressors on a pool of C corporations. There is no formal theoretical 
justification to determine which independent variables should be included and which 
should not. As mentioned in the literature review, all researchers in this field have 
selected variables depending on their datasets. Similarly, depending on variables 
available in my dataset and according to previous work (e.g., Hodders, 2003), I included 
three variables: equity, net earnings before NOL deduction, and age. It is necessary to 
emphasize that the critical independent variable of interest, average CIT rate, is not a 
linear transformation of another independent variable, net earnings before NOL 
deduction. They differ in two aspects: first, when calculating average CIT rate, I used the 
net earning after NOL rather than before NOL; second, the average CIT rate incorporates 
the progressiveness of statutory tax rates (i.e., the statutory tax rate increases as income 
increases). I expected the equity size to have a negative impact on the conversion from C 
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into S for two reasons. First, the IRS requires unanimous agreement among shareholders 
on the conversion into the S form; thus, the more shareholders there are, the more 
difficult it is to reach an agreement to elect the S form. Second, IRS limited the number 
of shareholders for S corporations (35 before 1997 and 75 after 1997); thus it is difficult 
for C corporations with large equity to downsize the shareholder numbers to below 35 or 
75. Also I expected that net earnings before NOL would have a negative impact on the 
conversion because higher net earnings imply more tax savings in the C form. I expect 
age to have a negative impact because the longer the history of the corporation, the more 
difficult it would be to switch its way of operation (e.g., to change leverage ratio and 
other tax shields) to utilize the benefits of the S form. The logistic regression model takes 
the following form:  
AgeEarningEquityCITrateSCofobability ×+×+×+×+=⇒ 43210 )ln()ln()(Pr βββββ
 
Table 2.4 shows the logistical regression results. The first column shows the 
regression result for hypothesis 2 on a pool of C and S corporations. The dependent 
variable is whether the corporation takes the S form and the critical independent variable 
is its average CIT rate in the same year. (If the corporation takes the S form, the average 
CIT rate is its potential CIT rate, had it been a C corporation.) The coefficient of the CIT 
rate is significantly negative, suggesting that corporations with higher CIT rates are more 
likely to take the C form, which is contradictory to the theoretical prediction that 
corporations choose organizational form to reduce tax payment. However, as mentioned, 
this regression suffers from an endogeneity problem and the results are biased.  
The second column shows results for hypothesis 2a on a pool of C corporations 
which are suitable to convert into the S form. The dependent variable is whether a C 
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corporation converts into the S form and the critical independent variable is its average 
CIT rate in the previous year. Coefficients of the CIT rate are positive and significant, 
suggesting that the higher the CIT rate in current year, the more likely the corporation 
will convert in the next year.  
The effect of equity size is significantly positive, which is contradictory to my 
initial expectation. However, according to Bennett (2001), over 90% of all S corporations 
have less than 10 shareholders, which suggests that the number of shareholders condition 
is not very restrictive. The positive effect of equity indicates that larger (but not too large) 
C corporations tend to convert into the S form compared with the smaller ones. The 
reason might be that shareholders of large corporations are wealthier and may value the 
provision to S corporations that allows S shareholders to pass S corporations’ losses to 
offset their income from other sources.  
The effect of earning is significantly negative. The reason could be that because 
all the net earnings of S corporations are subject to personal income tax regardless of 
whether they are distributed, corporations which usually retain some earnings and 
reinvest will prefer to stay as C corporations. The benefit of avoiding personal taxation 
on retained earnings may overwhelm the benefit of avoiding double taxation on 
dividends. The coefficient of age is also significantly negative, conforming to the 
prediction that the longer the corporation operates, the less likely it is to convert. 
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Table 2.4: Logistic Regression Results 
 Model (1) Model (2) 
 dependent variable: 
prob(corporation being an S 
firm) 
dependent variable: 
prob(C converts into S) 
intercept -0.087 -0.807*** 
 (0.088) (0.165) 
CIT tax rate -0.083 3.579*** 
 (0.083) (0.595) 
Ln(equity) -0.028*** 0.035*** 
 (0.008) (0.010) 
Ln(earning) 0.547*** -0.125*** 
 (0.011) (0.020) 
age -0.026*** -0.057*** 
 (0.002) (0.005) 
Concordant prediction 77% 65% 
Count R Square 92% 84% 
Adjusted Count R Square -2% 0% 
McFadden Adjusted R 
Square 
10% 4% 
N 66048 6212 
Note:  
*significant at 5%, **significant at 1%, ***significant at 0.1% 
 
2.9 Regression with an Instrumental Variable 
As mentioned earlier the OLS regression analysis of the dividend payout ratio 
suffers from an endogeneity problem, because corporations elect S status if they want to 
distribute a higher proportion of profits. The CIT rate in the preceding year can serve as 
an instrumental variable. Previous sections already provide empirical evidence supporting 
the theoretical prediction that corporations are more likely to convert from the C into the 
S form when they had faced a higher CIT rate in the previous year. On the other hand, the 
dividend payout ratio is the proportion of the current year’s after-tax profits distributed to 
shareholders, and theoretically, it should not be affected by the CIT rate the corporations 
had in the previous year. Therefore, I use the CIT rate of the preceding year as the 
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instrument. I confined my analysis to the pool of C corporations which meet the 
conditions for the S form and compared the dividend payout ratio between those which 
converted into the S form and those which did not. Following Heckman (1978), I first 
worked with a pool of C corporations (about 12% of them converted into the S form) and 
ran a logistic regression of whether the C corporation converts into S status based on its 
average CIT rate in the previous year to predict the probability of converting into an S 
corporation in the current year; then I ran an OLS regression of the dividend payout ratio 
in the current year with the organizational form dummy replaced by the predicted 
probability.  
Table 2.5 summarizes the regression results with instrumental variables. Column 
1 shows the OLS regression on another pool of C and S corporations, where all the C 
corporations meet the conditions to convert into the S form and all the S corporations 
were converted from the C form. Without controlling for the endogeneity problem, I 
found that S corporations on average distribute 26.7% more of after-tax profits as 
dividends than C corporations do. 
Column 2 shows the instrumental variable regression results when I substituted 
the predicted probability of converting into the S form for the S dummy variable, as 
derived from the logistic regression of model 2 in Table 2.4. With the instrumental 
variable, S corporations on average distribute 62% more of their profits to shareholders 
than comparable C corporations. The larger the equity size, the lower the dividend payout 
ratio. The more profits the firms earn, the higher the dividend payout ratio. The older the 
firms are, the higher dividend payout ratio. As column 2 shows, increasing equity size by 
1% is expected to reduce dividend payout ratio by 0.071 percentage points; increasing 
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profits by 1% is expected to increase dividend payout ratio by 0.058 percentage points; 
and corporations that are one year older are expected to distribute 0.6% more of their 
profits as dividends than their counterparts that are a year younger. The significant 
positive coefficient of the S dummy variable suggests that organizational form does have 
a significant impact on dividend payout ratio, which is what was predicted by the 
traditional view on dividend taxation. Therefore, the evidence in this paper supports the 
traditional view. 
 
Table 2.5: Regression Results with Instrumental Variables  
Dependent variable: 
dividend payout ratio 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept 0.539*** 0.357*** 0.343*** 
 (0.025) (0.034) (0.030) 
S_dummy 0.267*** 0.622*** 0.433*** 
 (0.011) (0.099) (0.066) 
Ln(equity) -0.066*** -0.071*** -0.072*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Ln(earning) 0.043*** 0.058*** 0.067*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Age 0.004*** 0.006*** 0.003*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Adjusted R square 47% 40% 42% 
N 4910 4910 3640 
 Note:   
*significant at 5%; **significant at 1%; ***significant at 0.1% 
Model 1: The OLS regression focuses on a pool of C corporations and compares dividend 
payout among those C corporations which chose not to convert into S and S corporations 
which were converted from C form. 
Model 2: The IV regression uses the CIT rate as the instrumental variable for the 
S_dummy, substitutes the predicted probability of conversion into S for the S_dummy 
and re-runs model 2. 
Model 3: The IV regression with the sample size shrunk to the pool of corporations with 
net worth less than the 75th percentile of S corporations.  
Standard deviations are in parentheses below the estimated coefficients. 
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One key assumption in the analysis is that C corporations with net worth less than 
the 99th percentile of that of S corporations are comparable to S corporations. The 99th 
percentile criterion is rather arbitrary and might over-count the number of C corporations 
eligible to switch into the S form. To check how sensitive my regression results are to the 
sample selection criterion, I shrank the sample to only C corporations whose net assets 
are less than the 75th percentile of S net worth. As shown in column 3 in Table 2.5, the 
impact of being an S corporation on dividend payout ratio decreases by one third but is 
still significantly positive, indicating that S corporations on average distribute 43.3% 
more of their profits than comparable C corporations. The impacts of equity size and net 
earnings do not change much from the results in column 2; the impact of age drops by 
half but is still positive and significant.  
2.10 Conclusions 
The debate of dividend tax reform centers on competing theories about the effects 
of dividend taxation on investment incentives. The traditional view supports the 
elimination of dividend tax, while the new view worries about the loss of federal tax 
revenue without stimulating much investment. Comparison of dividend payout ratio 
between C corporations and S corporations provides a good test of which view is more 
accurate. Simple regression of the dividend payout ratio on organizational forms seems to 
support the traditional view because S corporations pay significantly higher proportions 
of profits as dividends. However, such regression suffers from an endogeneity problem 
because it can be the case that corporations with high dividend payout ratios select the S 
form. This paper first shows that the CIT rates in preceding year affect investors’ 
decision about organizational forms. Then it uses the average CIT rate as an instrument 
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for organizational form and re-runs the regressions. The impact of organizational form is 
even larger. The empirical results in this paper confirm the traditional view, which 
suggests that dividends are more than just a way of distributing profits to shareholders 
and that corporations always try their best to distribute dividends even at the cost of 
investment opportunities. Therefore, the double taxation of dividends does have a 
significant negative effect on the total investment in the corporate sector.  
The Bush administration pushed for the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief 
Reconciliation Act of 2003, in which the top tax rate on dividends is set to be 15% (far 
less than the top tax rate on personal income—35%). The aim is to encourage corporate 
investment and stimulate economic growth. The findings of this paper support the 
traditional view and thus confirm the Bush administration’s efforts to stimulate corporate 
investment. However, despite the decrease in the dividend tax rate, corporate income is 
still taxed at a rate of 45% (=1-[1-0.35]*[1-0.15]), under the highest corporate income tax 
rate of 35% and highest dividend tax rate of 15%. It is still higher than the highest 
personal income tax rate of 35% faced by noncorporate entities. It seems that further 
reduction of dividend tax rate is necessary. On the other hand, the reduction of dividend 
tax causes the loss of large amounts of federal tax revenue. Further study is necessary to 
evaluate the appropriateness of the degree of reduction in dividend taxation and its 
overall impact on the general economy by combining the results from the increase in 
corporate investment and the loss in federal tax revenue. 
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CHAPTER 3—ESSAY TWO 
CORPORATE INCOME TAX AND NONPROFIT VERSUS FOR-
PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: EVIDENCE FROM THE HOSPITAL 
INDUSTRY 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In the United States, nonprofit organizations (NPOs) and for-profit organizations 
(FPOs) coexist and compete with one another in certain industries, such as health care 
and education. Compared with their for-profit competitors, NPOs receive favorable tax 
treatment. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) exempts NPOs’ mission-relevant income 
from the federal corporate income tax (CIT). Some states also exempt them from state 
income, property, and sales taxes. Economists and policy makers have been debating 
whether NPOs should be granted tax exemption. However, up till now, it has not been 
clear whether tax exemption affects the NPOs’ activities. Empirical evidence is limited 
and inconclusive. If tax exemption does not affect NPOs’ activities and their competition 
with FPOs, then the debate on tax exemption to NPOs is less meaningful and tax 
exemption may be repealed. New findings of whether such impact exists have direct 
policy implications in three aspects. 
First, as Simon (1987) argues, one use of the tax laws is to regulate the extent to 
which NPOs can operate in the business and public sectors by competing with for-profit 
or governmental entities. The proof of a positive relationship between tax exemption and 
nonprofit activities would help policy makers to determine whether Simon’s claim is 
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correct that tax law is an effective measure to regulate the extent of NPOs’ activities. Due 
to their different objectives, NPOs and FPOs may perform differently, and it is necessary 
for the government to regulate their competition to achieve optimal social and economic 
benefits. On the one hand, the efficient operation of FPOs serves as a benchmark of 
operational efficiency; on the other hand, NPOs provide benchmarks for quality and 
prices. The extent of NPOs’ activity affects social welfare. For example, Kessler and 
McClellan (2002) suggest that controlling the shares of for-profit and nonprofit cardiac 
hospitals within a certain range can effectively reduce care expenditure without reducing 
care quality. Given the positive impact of tax exemption, policy makers can encourage 
nonprofit activity by increasing their tax subsidies if they find out that more nonprofit 
activities improve social welfare, or reduce tax exemption otherwise.  
Second, one rationale for Congress to exempt NPOs from corporate income tax is 
that such tax subsidy will alleviate the difficulties NPOs have in accessing capital market, 
so that they can compete with FPOs. However, tax exemption may be unnecessary 
because NPOs may be able to survive without it, since customers may choose to 
patronize NPOs rather than FPOs. For example, Arrow (1963) argues that consumers 
select nonprofit rather for-profit organizations because they trust NPOs. Thus NPOs may 
continue to exist without tax exemptions. However, Steinberg (1987) argued that NPOs 
generally operate less efficiently than their for-profit counterparts because nonprofit 
administrators lack the incentive for efficient operation and the owners of NPOs do not 
have effective measurements to evaluate and monitor nonprofit administrators’ 
performance. If these arguments are true, then such tax exemption does not encourage 
NPOs’ activity and may be wasted by their inefficient operation. The federal government 
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has never provided an estimate on how much tax revenue is foregone due to tax 
exemptions to NPOs because the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 did not mandate the 
inclusion of such tax expenditures (Brody 1998). However, it should not be negligible 
nowadays, as NPOs have taken an important place in the economy. For example, 
Meckstoth and Arnsberger (1998) found that NPOs’ revenue amounted to 12% of the 
GDP in 1995. Gentry and Penrod (2000) estimated that the corporate income tax 
subsidies to nonprofit hospitals were $4.6 billion in 1995. Empirical evidence of positive 
impact of tax subsidy to NPOs’ activities will justify the tax exemption. However, even if 
we cannot find a positive impact of tax exemption to NPOs, we should not rush into the a 
decision to impose taxes on NPOs to increase tax revenue because NPOs may change 
their behavior by reducing prices or improving employee compensations; the ultimate 
impact on tax revenue is unknown (Congressional Budget Office 2005). 
Third, as competing for-profit organizations are not exempted from taxes, policy 
makers and law researchers are concerned with the unfair competition between NPOs and 
FPOs. Proprietary business owners complain that such unfair competition lowers their 
market share. However, it is not clear whether FPOs suffer from the different tax 
treatment. If FPOs’ market share does not change with the CIT rate, the claim that tax 
exemption help NPOs to drive FPOs out of market may be undermined. Thus, empirical 
research is necessary to show whether FPOs market shares are related to the tax 
exemption.  
Empirical evidence of the impact of tax exemption on nonprofit activities is 
inadequate due to limited access to appropriate data. Researchers focus on property taxes, 
sales tax, and state CIT. No conclusive evidence has been found on whether tax 
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exemption helps NPOs increase their service provisions. In particular, no study has been 
made specifically on the impact of federal CIT exemption. This paper uses aggregated 
market share data to examine the relationship between different federal CIT treatments 
and market shares.  
Three clarifications are necessary before proceeding with my analysis. First, 
although NPOs can take a variety of legal forms (e.g., charitable trust and unincorporated 
associations), almost all choose the corporate form because it limits the liability of the 
owners and provides other benefits (Hansmann, 1981). Thus even though exemption 
from CIT extends to NPOs with various forms, this paper confines its analysis to 
incorporated NPOs.  
Second, this paper focuses on commercial NPOs, which gather their capital 
almost completely on a fee-for-service basis, rather than donative NPOs, which receive a 
large proportion of their capital from private donations or government grants. (See 
Hansmann [1981, 1987a] for definitions and examples of these two types of NPOs.) 
Goods or services provided by donative NPOs are generally public goods (which means 
that their goods and services have positive externalities exceeding their costs) and there 
are relatively fewer for-profit competitors. There are fewer disputes on the tax subsidies 
to donative NPOs. However, a significant proportion of goods and services provided by 
commercial NPOs, such as hospitals and nursing homes, are also provided by their for-
profit competitors. According to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO, 2005), 
commercial NPOs in the health care sector received 92% of their revenue from selling 
their services in 2001; the value of private goods and services provided by all commercial 
 49
NPOs made up 3.4% of the net domestic product in 2002. This paper focuses on 
commercial NPOs, rather than donative NPOs.  
Third, NPOs and FPOs coexist in health services, education, social services, 
culture and entertainment, and research, among other industries. As health service is the 
industry most interesting to researchers from various perspectives, its data are more 
readily available compared with the other industries. For the ease of data collection, I 
confined my analysis to the hospital industry. Therefore, it is important to note that the 
findings especially related to the hospital industry. 
In the following sections, section 3.2 reviews the literature on the coexistence 
phenomena of commercial NPOs and FPOs and the impact of tax exemption on NPOs’ 
market share. Section 3.3 justifies the appropriateness of the regression model to examine 
the impact of federal CIT exemption on NPOs market share. Section 3.4 describes the 
datasets and historical background of tax rules. Section 3.5 presents the analysis at both 
the national level and the state level. Section 3.6 makes the conclusion and discussions. 
3.2 Literature Review 
Voluminous literature discusses the reason of the presence of commercial NPOs 
and their dominance in industries such as health care. The arguments can be divided into 
two strands. One focuses on the consumer’s trust in nonprofit form; the other emphasizes 
the subsidies NPOs receive.  
3.2.1 The Contract Failure Theory 
 Hansmann (1980) and Nelson and Krashinsky (1973) extend Arrow’s (1963) 
principal-agent theory in economics and propose the contract failure theory to explain 
why NPOs can compete with FPOs. They argue that NPOs and FPOs coexist in industries 
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where it is difficult for consumers to get full information in order to evaluate and monitor 
the goods or services (e.g., hospital or nursing home services). Customers are principals 
and the services providers are agents. Due to asymmetric information, providers can 
potentially use that advantage to benefit themselves. For example, they can provide 
services of lower quality but charge higher prices, and consumers do not have enough 
knowledge to find it out. Because FPOs’ objective is to maximize their profits, they may 
have the motive to provide goods or services of disproportionately low quality. On the 
other hand, NPOs cannot pay any cash dividend to their owners; nonprofit managers 
cannot add profits to their salaries ex post; and even when NPOs are sold or liquidated, 
all revenue must be directed to another NPO, rather then distributed among owners. 
Therefore, restricted by the non-distribution constraint, NPOs do not have such incentives 
to cheat the consumers and are deemed more trustworthy than FPOs by some customers. 
Customers’ preference to patronize NPOs helps them survive in the face of competition 
from FPOs. The contract failure theory is influential and is the fundamental assumption 
of many economic models of NPO behavior (e.g., Glaeser & Shleifer, 2001). However, it 
has not passed the empirical test (e.g., Permut 1981; David & Malani 2003; and Philipson 
2000).  
3.2.2 The Tax Subsidy Theory 
The subsidy theory, which is proposed by Hansmann (1987b), states that 
commercial NPOs are able to compete with FPOs because they receive various subsidies 
from the government, such as tax exemption and a preferred postal rate. The major 
subsidies consist of three types of tax exemption. First, NPOs are exempted from both 
corporate income tax and property tax. Second, they can issue tax-exempt bonds; lenders 
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do not pay personal or corporate income taxes on received interest, allowing NPOs to 
borrow at a lower interest cost. Third, donors can deduct donations to NPOs from their 
taxable income. According to Gentry and Penrod (2000), the aggregated value of 
corporate income tax exemption for nonprofit hospitals in 1995 was $4.6 billion, and the 
value of property tax exemption was $1.7 billion; in 1994, the benefit to nonprofit 
hospitals from issuing tax-exempt bonds was $354 million and government tax loss due 
to deduction of donations nonprofit hospitals equal $1.1 billion. 
Very limited empirical work examines the impact of tax exemptions on the 
activities of NPOs. Hansmann (1987b) estimates the impact of differentials in state taxes 
(including sales, property, and corporate income taxes) on NPOs’ market shares in 
nursing homes, hospitals, primary and secondary schools, and vocational schools, using 
cross-sectional aggregated state data from 1975. He defines NPOs’ market share in 
different industry differently. In particular, he defines the market shares of hospitals and 
nursing homes as the percentage of non-governmental beds in the nonprofit sector and 
defines the market shares of nonprofit primary, secondary, and vocational schools as the 
percentage of non-governmental enrollment in nonprofit sector. He examines the tax 
effect in two aggregate levels: the state level and the largest city of each state level. He 
tries several different specifications of his regressions. He does not find unanimous 
evidence showing that tax exemption significantly increases nonprofit institutions’ 
market share. In particular, in his separate regressions for each industry and at each 
aggregate level, only 5 of the 21 tax coefficients are statistically significant. When he 
pools the industries together at the state level, state corporate income tax and sales tax 
significantly increase nonprofit market share, while property tax does not have any 
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significant impact; however, when he pools the industries at the biggest city level, only 
state corporate income tax’s impact is significant. 
Chang and Tuckman (1990) examine whether the difference in property tax rates 
in various counties in Tennessee affects the nonprofit hospitals’ activities. They test three 
hypotheses: 1) higher property tax rates increase nonprofit hospitals’ market share, where 
the market share is measured as total nonprofit inpatient days per year divided by total 
annual hospital inpatient days for all types of hospitals—nonprofit, for-profit and 
government hospitals; 2) higher property tax rates increase the probability that a county 
will have a single hospital; and 3) higher property tax rates increase the probability that 
the single hospital in a county will be nonprofit. Surprisingly, their regression results 
show that higher property tax rates do not just fail to increase nonprofit hospitals’ market 
share, but rather statistically significantly reduce their share. Also, even though higher tax 
rates increase the probability that a county in Tennessee has a single hospital, they have 
no significant impact on whether the hospital is nonprofit. In sum, the overall impact of a 
higher tax rate is to reduce nonprofit hospitals’ market share. However, Chang and 
Tuckman’s results should be accepted with caution because counties with higher property 
tax rates are rich counties where for-profit hospitals are eager to serve and expand. 
Gulley and Santerre (1993) employ panel data covering 50 states plus the District 
of Columbia at 5-year intervals from 1967 to 1987. They define market share as the 
percentage of hospital beds and run simultaneous regressions for nonprofit hospitals’ 
market share, for-profit hospitals’ market share, and governmental hospitals’ market 
share with the cross-equation constraint that the corresponding regression coefficients 
from all the three regressions sum to zero (because the sum of the changes in market 
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share must equal zero). In contrast to previous scholars’ results, Gulley and Santerre find 
that both the state corporate income tax rate and the property tax rate positively influence 
NPO market share, but that only the corporate income tax rate negatively affects FPO 
market share. They explain the asymmetric impact of the property tax rate on NP and FP 
hospitals with the ad hoc reason that FP hospitals have already capitalized on the property 
tax ever since their establishment, and thus are not affected by its change, while NP 
hospitals do not capitalize on the tax. However, this explanation deserves more scrutiny. 
In summary, the current empirical work is not conclusive on whether tax 
subsidies have a positive impact on nonprofit hospitals’ market share. Moreover, all the 
studies focus on state level taxes. No work has been done to investigate the federal 
corporate income tax impact. As Steinberg (1991) points out “Hansmann and Chang and 
Tuckman are unable to estimate the impact of federal tax differentials because they 
employ a single cross-section of state-, county-, or city-level data. Federal tax 
differentials simply don’t vary across these samples, so their impact is not estimatable. 
This gap could be filled by a similar study utilizing nationwide time-series data.” This 
essay attempts to fill the research gap by focusing on aggregated time series in both 
national and state levels to study the impact of exemption of federal corporate income 
tax. 
3.3 A Regression Model 
Little work in the literature has explicitly explained the mechanism through which 
the change of corporate income tax rates affects the market share of nonprofit 
organizations. However, the relationship can be justified through at least two theoretical 
frameworks—the competition framework and the entrepreneurs’ framework. Within the 
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competition framework, NPOs and FPOs compete with each other and the tax exemption 
gives NPOs competitive edges through three facets. First, tax exemption allows NPOs to 
accumulate net earnings at a faster speed than comparable FPOs, thus making NPOs 
more financially robust. As the CIT rate increases, the relative robustness of NPOs 
becomes more significant. Second, the cost of capital for for-profit investors increases 
with the CIT rate. As shown in the previous chapter, the cost of capital formulas for 
ordinary for-profit corporations (i.e., C corporations) under the traditional view and new 
view of double taxation are  
( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ]zmKc −−+−−== 1111)(' αατ
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and 
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, 
where ρ is the investors’ required rate of return, τ is CIT rate, α is dividend payout ratio, 
m is the individual income tax rate, and z is the accrual capital gain tax rate. 
The CIT rate—τ, appears in the denominators of both cost-of-capital formulas, 
which means that as the CIT rate increases, the cost of capital increases. As the cost of 
capital increases, investment in for-profit corporations declines and capital stock within 
FPOs declines. Therefore, for-profit corporations face higher financial pressure; as a 
result, they may either stop expansion or exit the industry. For example, Culter and 
Horwitz (2000) recorded a case where a financially depressed for-profit hospital first 
suspended construction on a partially completed tower at the hospital complex and later 
sold all the hospital assets to a nonprofit hospital established by doctors and community 
members.  
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Third, as Newhouse (1970) argues, tax subsidies, together with philanthropic 
donations, allow nonprofit hospitals to undersell for-profit hospitals and forestall the 
entry and expansion of for-profit hospitals, even though they may operate less efficiently 
by pursuing too high a quality of their services. A higher CIT rate gives NPOs more 
capability to implement such a strategy against FPOs. On the other hand, expansion and 
entry of NPOs are not affected by the increase of the CIT rate. Therefore, competing 
NPOs will gain larger market share with a higher corporate income tax rate. 
Within the entrepreneurial framework, the CIT rate affects entrepreneurs’ 
decision on nonprofit versus for-profit forms. Here, the term “entrepreneurs” represents 
all the people who can influence the organizational status and operation. In nonprofit 
hospitals, they can include the trustees, board of directors, administrators, doctors and 
medical staffs. All these people differ in their objectives and make combined decisions 
with compromises to one another. However, we can assume that there is a “virtual” single 
entrepreneur in each hospital making the final decision.  
Mackie-Mason and Gordon (1997) analyzed the impact of CIT exemption on 
noncorporate firms on the market share of noncorporate and corporate firms. They built 
up a model showing that the CIT rate affects the market share of noncorporate firms 
because entrepreneurs choose the appropriate form to maximize their after-tax income. 
They measure the market shares of noncorporate and corporate firms in terms of asset 
size and taxable income and regress the market shares on the CIT rate to measure its 
impact. I borrowed their idea to model entrepreneurs’ decision on nonprofit versus for-
profit forms. However, there is an obstacle to borrowing their model. In their model, the 
entrepreneurs’ objective is to maximize after-tax income; however, this may not be true 
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for nonprofit entrepreneurs, so that I do not know under what conditions entrepreneurs 
will choose nonprofit or for-profit forms.  
There has been no agreement on what nonprofit entrepreneurs seek to maximize. 
Newhouse (1970) postulates a model of constrained quantity-quality maximization; 
Brooks (2005) proposes service maximization; Danzon (1982) puts up dividend-in-kind 
maximization because nonprofit entrepreneurs cannot put cash into their pockets. In her 
output aalysis, Rose-Ackerman (1982) even assumes that NPOs maximize profits as 
FPOs do in an oligopoly market consisting of nonprofit and for-profit competitors.  
Despite the diverse apparent objectives in the literature, I assumed that nonprofit 
entrepreneurs achieve their objectives through two steps. In the first step, they maximize 
the net income in the same way that for-profit entrepreneurs do; in the second step, they 
use the earned profits to achieve their objectives. Nonprofit entrepreneurs may maximize 
their utilities by spending the maximized net income on purchasing various perquisites, 
such as pleasing subordinates as listed by Sternberg (1987), “buying” their reputations 
through quality improvement or fulfilling their altruistic nature through fees reduction. I 
assumed that the entrepreneurs’ utility from the achievement of their objectives increases 
monotonically with the profits they can earn in the first step. The net earnings of the 
nonprofit form is denoted as π and the utility to nonprofit entrepreneurs as Unp(π). The 
for-profit form can earn net income π+g, where g represents the net benefit of the for-
profit form. It is positive when the advantage of the for-profit form, such as easy access 
to the capital market exceeds the disadvantage, such as customers’ trust in nonprofit 
organizations as the contract failure theory predicts; it is negative otherwise. As the for-
profit form is subject to CIT with the rate of τ, for-profit entrepreneurs’ net income is (1–
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τ)(π+g) and denote the utility to for-profit entrepreneurs as Ufp([1– τ][π + g]). 
Entrepreneurs choose the for-profit form when Ufp([1– τ][π + g]) > Unp(π). Under the 
classical assumption of utility function, i.e., U' >0, the probability of Ufp([1 – τ][π + g]) > 
Unp(π) decreases as τ increases, which means that entrepreneurs are less likely to choose a 
for-profit form when corporate income tax is higher.  
If we can assume the utility functions of nonprofit and for-profit entrepreneurs are 
the same, i.e. Ufp(.) = Unp(.), entrepreneurs choose the for-profit form when (1 – τ)(π + g) 
> π, i.e., g>πτ/(1 – τ). Conditionally on net income’s (π’s) being positive, which is the 
case in the hospital industry, entrepreneurs choose a for-profit form when g/π > τ/(1 – τ). 
Otherwise they choose a nonprofit form. If we can further assume that the random 
variable g/π has certain probabilistic distribution, then the integration from negative 
infinity to τ/(1 – τ) represents the nonprofit share and integration from τ/(1 – τ) represents 
the for-profit share. In Figure 3.1, the area to the left of τ/(1 – τ) under the probability 
density curve is the nonprofit share and the area to the right is the for-profit form. 
Increasing the crucial value τ/(1 – τ) reduces the area to the right but increases the area to 
the left. More specifically, because τ/(1 – τ) increases monotonically with τ, a higher CIT 
rate increases nonprofit market share.  
 
Figure 3.1 Market Share of Nonprofit versus For-profit Organizations 
 
g/π
FPNP
τ/(1- τ) 
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Both frameworks suggest that as CIT rates increase, the NPOs’ market share will 
increase. In the subsequent sections, I empirically examine whether federal corporation 
income tax increases the market share of NPOs. However, this examination must be done 
carefully due to the CIT rules which seem to undermine the validity of this model. These 
two confusing rules concern the tax difference on corporate versus noncorporate firms 
and the Unrelated Business Income Tax on NPOs. Further explicit justifications are 
necessary. 
First, according to IRS tax regulations, only for-profit corporations are taxed by 
federal corporate income tax, but for-profit noncorporate organizations are exempted 
from CIT. It appears that we should focus on nonprofit corporations and for-profit 
corporations in order to correctly estimate the impact of federal corporate income tax. It 
is very difficult to find such kinds of datasets to make the examination. Even in the 
intensively studied hospital industry, no publicly available source has shown whether 
there exists any noncorporate hospital. Fortunately, at least in theory, all the NPOs should 
take the form of corporations because the noncorporate form does not give them any 
benefit, while the corporate form gives them benefits like limited liability. With regard to 
FPOs, even though there could be corporations and noncorporate entities, the profitability 
of various organizational forms should be similar, after controlling advantages and 
disadvantages of corporate and noncorporate forms; otherwise FPOs will change 
organizational forms, expand, or go out of business until equilibrium in profitability is 
reached. Therefore, even though federal income tax only applies to for-profit 
corporations, it implicitly also influences for-profit noncorporate entities. It would not be 
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a big problem if I examined federal income tax’s impact on NPOs versus FPOs market 
share without accounting for the possible noncorporate forms.  
Second, the IRS does not exempt NPOs’ income received from unrelated 
business. In fact, many NPOs do unrelated business. For example, in the hospital 
industry, selling medication to ambulatory patients or patients of affiliated physicians but 
not the hospitals themselves is unrelated business and the revenue should be taxed by 
UBIT (McDaniel & Fink, 1985). Hines (1999) found that nonprofit entrepreneurs’ 
willingness to do unrelated business increases with their financial pressure. Cordes and 
Weisbrod (1998) found that the decision to do unrelated business is also influenced by 
the size of the excess return created by differential taxation of NPOs and FPOs; in areas 
with more favorable tax treatment to NPOs, NPOs are more likely to do unrelated 
business.  
In 1950, Congress created the Unrelated Business Income Tax (UBIT), a tax 
system very similar to the corporate income tax, with two objectives: to prevent unfair 
competition, because NPOs’ cost of capital would be less than that of FPOs if the 
unrelated business income were not taxed, and to increase tax revenue (U.S. House, 
1950). This suggests that we would have to focus on the sub-industries where only the 
NPOs’ mission goods and services are marketed. For example, if only the nuclear 
radioactive treatment of NPO hospitals is tax-exempt, we might have to focus only on the 
nuclear treatment market, rather than the general hospital market. This would create data 
collection difficulties because few datasets provide specific detailed information of sub-
industries.  
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Fortunately, abundant evidence has shown that UBIT does not effectively tax 
NPOs’ unrelated business income, because NPOs can easily shift the cost for producing 
NPO mission goods or services to unrelated goods or services. Sansing (1998) provides 
theoretical framework explaining the inefficacy of UBIT. Yetman (2001), Yetman 
(2003), and Omer and Yetman (2001) provide empirical evidence showing NPOs allocate 
disproportionately higher expense from their mission-related business to unrelated 
business; in particular, nonprofit hospitals are more likely to report near zero taxable 
income than other NPOs.  
Besides the ineffectiveness due to easy cost manipulation in NPOs’ accounting 
practice, some important income from unrelated business such as rents, dividends, and 
royalties are exempted from UBIT in current tax rules. Therefore, there should not be a 
big problem if we overlook the impact of UBIT and just look at the general industries, as 
if all of NPOs’ activities were not taxed. 
3.4 Hospital Data and CIT History 
3.4.1 Hospital Data 
It is very difficult to get a comprehensive dataset including various industries 
where NPOs and FPOs compete. However, data on the hospital sector are available for 
public use because the type of ownership in the hospital sectors has been an interest to 
many economists and policy makers for a long time. Therefore, I focused on the hospitals 
sector in the health care industry and used data from Hospital Statistics published by the 
American Hospitals Association (AHA).  
The AHA surveys its members every year to collect the data for the publication of 
Hospital Statistics.  Almost all the hospitals in the United States have registered with the 
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AHA and been counted in the yearly survey. For example, there were 2,886 nonprofit, 
882 for-profit, and 8,788 state and local government short-term community hospitals 
registered as AHA members and counted in the hospital statistics in 1992. After referring 
to hospital list in the National Center for Health Statistics and various directories of the 
hospital industry, AHA identifies that only 13 nonprofit, 15 for-profit, and 14 state and 
local government hospitals were not AHA members. (Please refer to Hospital Statistics 
1993/94, Table 1 and Table 14.) Similarly, only 16 nonprofit, 21 for-profit, and 15 state 
and local government hospitals were not AHA members in 1993, while a total of 3,154 
nonprofit, 717 for-profit, and 1,390 state and local government community hospitals were 
listed as members. (Please refer to Hospital Statistics 1994/95, Table 1 and Table 14.) 
Hospital Statistics provides aggregated hospital measurements at both national 
and state levels. At the national level, it provides two strings of time series. One is the 29-
year time series of nonfederal short-term hospitals from 1965 to 1993. The other is the 
29-year time series of short-term community hospitals from 1972 through 2000. 
According to AHA definition, the nonfederal short-term hospitals category is a little bit 
larger than the community hospitals category because the former includes special 
hospitals such as psychiatric hospitals and hospitals for tuberculosis. However, the 
number of such special hospitals is few and there is little difference between these two 
categories. For example, the nonfederal short-term hospitals category contained 4,934 
hospitals in 2000, while the community hospital category contained 4,915 hospitals in the 
same year. Furthermore, the market share distributions of non-federal short-term 
hospitals and short-term community hospitals between 1972 through 1993 are almost 
identical. For example, when I compared the market share in terms of number of 
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hospitals from 1972 to 1993, the Pearson coefficient of correlation between these two 
categories was 0.999. In order to have a larger sample size of market share in the national 
level, I combined the two types of hospitals together so that the 1965 through 1993 time 
series contained market share information for non-federal short-term hospitals and the 
1994 through 2000 time series contained market share information for short-term 
community hospitals. Thus, I have 36 years of national-level time series from 1965 
through 2000. At the state level, I used the aggregate market share information for all 50 
states plus the District of Columbia for 21 years from 1975 through 1995 and did a cross-
sectional time series analysis.  
The theoretical frameworks in the previous section have shown that nonprofit 
hospitals’ market share will increase with the corporate income tax rate. A little more 
thought on how to construct the market share measurement is worthwhile. It seems 
natural to define the nonprofit hospitals’ market share as the percentage of the total 
number of hospitals that are nonprofit. However, constructing the measurement in this 
way obscures the difference in size among nonprofit, for-profit, and governmental 
hospitals. Nonprofit hospitals on average are larger than for-profit hospitals. For example, 
David (2003, p. 4) notes that “For more than three decades, between 1928 and the early 
1960s nonprofit hospitals maintained on average more than three times as many beds per 
hospital as their for-profit counterparts, by 2000 the average nonprofit was only 32% 
larger than the typical for-profit hospitals.”  
Moreover, merger transactions and closures are not rare in the hospital industry. 
For instance, Cutler and Horwitz (2000) report the merger of nonprofit hospitals in their 
case study of converting hospitals from nonprofit to for-profit status, and Steinwald and 
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Newhauser (1970) find that small hospitals are more likely to close than larger ones. 
Thus the percentage of total number of hospitals which are nonprofit may change while 
the percentages of patients or assets in nonprofit sector do not.  
Given this defect of using the number of hospitals, scholars usually use the 
number of beds to define market share (e.g., Steinwald & Neuhauser, 1970; Hansmann 
1987b; and Gulley & Santerre 1993). Chang and Tuckman (1990) use inpatient hospital 
days to define market share. If we can assume that inpatients’ patronage to hospitals is 
connected to the hospitals’ size (i.e., on average, larger hospitals have more inpatients), 
then Chang and Tuckman’s measurement using inpatient hospital days should not differ 
much from the other measurement using beds.  
Therefore, I constructed a measurement of nonprofit market share as the 
percentage of total hospital beds that are nonprofit. I also constructed a second 
measurement similar to that of Chang and Tuckman (1993). It is calculated in terms of 
admissions, defined as number of patients accepted for inpatient service during the 
reporting period, excluding newborns. Figure 3.2 illustrates the time trend of the 
nonprofit market share aggregated at the national level. The nonprofit market shares in 
terms of beds and admissions fluctuated within a small range and show similar patterns. 
Both market shares show obvious upward time trends before 1992, drops between 1992 
and 1997, and rises again after 1997. However, the market share in terms of beds dropped 
dramatically between 1992 and 1997, so that the market share in 1997 was lowest across 
the study period. Nevertheless, the drop in market share in terms of admissions was not 
much between 1992 and 1997  
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Figure 3.2a Nonprofit Hospital Market Share in Terms of Beds 
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Data source: Hospital Statistics by AHA 
Figure 3.2b Nonprofit Hospital Market Share in Terms of Admissions 
 
Figure 3.2: Nonprofit Hospital Market Share Time Trend 
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3.4.2 CIT History 
The CIT rate fluctuates between 1965 and 1995. For example, the highest 
statutory CIT rate was 48% from 1965 through 1977; it was reduced by 2 percentage 
points in 1978 and remained at 46% till 1986. It was reduced further to 34% in 1987 and 
remained there through 1992; and it was increased to 35% in 1993 and remained at that 
rate till 2000. However, the highest statutory rate does not fully reflect the changes in the 
actual tax rate on corporate income due to dramatic changes in detailed tax provisions by 
major tax reform acts. For example, TRA86 reduced the highest statutory CIT rate but 
closed a lot of loopholes through which corporations had shielded their income, so that 
the effective marginal tax rates rose. During the study period of 1965 to 2000, several 
major tax laws were implemented to change corporate income taxation, which 
subsequently changed the relative federal CIT exemption enjoyed by NPOs. According to 
the “Changes of Law” section in the yearly publication of Statistics of Income—
Corporation Income Tax Returns, these major law changes include:  
Revenue Act of 1971— it created the Class Life Asset Depreciation Range 
(CLADR) System and corporations must use this system to calculate depreciation and 
report taxable corporate income. 
Revenue Act of 1978— it reduced the highest tax rate from 48% to 46%. 
Revenue Act of 1981— it replaced the CLADR system with the Accelerated Cost 
Recovery System, which gave firms more generous deductions. 
Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982— it instituted a half-basis 
adjustment for investment tax credits in calculating depreciation. It repealed the 
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acceleration of depreciation scheduled in 1985 and 1986 by the Economic Recovery Tax 
Act of 1981. 
Tax Reform Act of 1986— it was the most influential tax law in history. It 
reduced maximum corporate income tax rate from 46 percent to 34 percent, but 
broadened the corporate income tax base by repealing the investment tax credit, limiting 
depreciation deductions, restricting the use of net operating losses, etc. It also introduced 
the Alternative Minimum Tax. 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993— it increased the top tax rate of 
individual income to be 39.6%, and corporate income to 35%. 
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997— it removed the Alternative Minimum Tax for C 
corporations that earn less than $7.5 million in receipts after 1997. 
Corporate income taxation in the United States is complicated because it is 
progressive—the marginal tax rate is higher for corporations with net income over certain 
thresholds and there are various provisions of exemption and deduction of the CIT (e.g., 
the Net Operating Loss can be carried forward to deduct from future income and carried 
back to claim tax refunds.). The average CIT rate comprehensively captures all such 
details in tax regulation and reflects the true tax rate. As I cannot get the average CIT in 
the hospital industry, I used the average CIT rate in the economy as a proxy. I extracted 
the national aggregated corporate income tax payment time series and the corporate 
taxable income time series from Nation Income Produce Account (NIPA) published by 
the Bureau of Economic Analysis, and I define the average CIT rate as the ratio of total 
corporate income tax payment divided by total corporate taxable income in the economy. 
Figure 3.3 illustrates the time trend of the average CIT rate across the sample years. 
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Source: NIPA 
Figure 3.3: Average CIT Rate across the Sample Years 
 
3.4.3 Profitability 
Corporate income taxation is different from property taxes or sales taxes (which 
are of interest in previous studies) because corporate income taxation only taxes the net 
profits, whereas the property taxation and sales taxation are applied regardless of 
hospitals’ profitability. If for-profit hospitals do not earn any profits, then they do not pay 
any corporate income tax and it is impossible to study the impact of CIT exemption on 
nonprofit hospitals’ market share. Therefore, I have to make sure that for-profit hospitals 
made profit in the study period.  
AHA only provides information on hospitals’ total expenditure, but does not 
provide information about hospitals’ profitability. However, NIPA provides the total 
personal consumption expenditures in all hospitals by type of ownership (on NIPA Table 
2.5.5). The personal consumption expenditure in various types of hospitals consists of 
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both households’ out-of-pocket payments and third party payments including those by 
employer and government insurance programs. If we divide the total personal 
consumption expenditure by average daily census—an index of combined inpatients and 
outpatients each day, times the total number of days in a year—we can get the average 
price each patient pays for one visit or day. Similarly, if we divide the hospitals’ total 
expenditures by the average daily census times 365, we get the hospitals’ average cost 
per patient visit or day. Comparing the average cost and price shows the profitability of 
the hospitals.  
Figure 3.4 illustrates the average expenditure ratio and average price ratio of 
nonprofit hospitals to for-profit hospitals. The interesting finding is that the average 
expenditure in nonprofit hospitals does not differ much from that in for-profit hospitals 
(except in 1998, which is probably an outlier); however, the average price nonprofit 
hospitals charge is only about 70–80% of that of for-profit hospitals for most of the years, 
but that percentage increased to 90% in 1998 through 2000.  
Figure 3.5 illustrates the difference between nonprofit and for-profit hospitals 
from another angle by comparing the ratio of average price to average expenditure 
between nonprofit and for-profit hospitals. Both nonprofit and for-profit hospitals charge 
more than the average expenditure (except in 1998 for nonprofit hospitals); however, in 
1969, nonprofit hospitals’ charge was only slightly higher than the expenditure while for-
profit hospitals charged about 70% more than their expenditure. After 1974, for-profit 
hospitals charged 30–40% more than their expenditures.  
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Source: Hospital Statistics and NIPA 
Figure 3.4 Nonprofit to For-Profit Ratios of Average Expenditure and Average Price 
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Source: Hospital Statistics and NIPA 
Figure 3.5 Price/Expenditure Ratios for Nonprofit and For-Profit Hospitals 
 
Figures 3.4 and 3.5 show that both types of hospitals earned profits in aggregate. 
This result is corroborated by the report by the Prospective Payment Assessment 
Commission (1995), which focused on the Medicare provision hospitals. The commission 
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found both nonprofit and for-profit hospitals made profits in aggregate from 1984 
through 1993. 
3.5 Analysis and Results 
As I have national and state level data, I analyze them separately. The national-
level data, which contains 35 years’ worth of information, is suitable for time series 
analysis and the state-level data, which contains information of all 50 states and 
Washington DC for 21 years, is suitable for longitudinal data analysis.  
3.5.1 National Level 
Visual examination of both the dependent variables of market shares and the 
independent variable of the average tax rate in Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3 shows a clear 
time trend of those variables, which means that they are nonstationary. Granger and 
Newbold (1974) have presented cases where two unrelated variables can show a 
significant statistical relationship simply because the time series of both variables are 
nonstationary. The usual approach to dealing with nonstationary variables is the first 
difference operation. (Greene 2000 provides detailed discussion on page 778.) Dickey 
and Fuller (1979, 1981) provided an Augmented Dickey-Fuller test on unit-root 
nonstationarity. Their null hypothesis is that there exists a unit-root nonstationarity in the 
time series. If the calculated Tau statistic is significantly negative, then we can reject the 
null hypothesis and conclude that the time series is stationary. Table 3.1 summarizes the 
testing results of the time series and their first difference. It is obvious that both market 
shares and average CIT rate are nonstationary; however, their first differences are 
stationary. For example, the Tau statistic for the dependent variable of nonprofit market 
share in terms of beds is –2.55 with p-value of 0.113, which is not significant even at a 
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10% significance level, suggesting that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that market 
share in terms of beds is unit-root nonstationary. However, after the first difference, the 
Tau statistic becomes –4.64, which is significant at a 0.1% significance level, suggesting 
that we should reject the null hypothesis that the first-differenced market share in terms 
of beds is unit-root nonstationary. 
 
Table 3.1: Non-Stationarity Tests of Dependent and Independent Variables 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test of unit root non-stationarity 
 Tau P-value 
Market share-beds –2.55 0.113 
Market share-admissions –1.00 0.743 
Average CIT rate –1.38 0.578 
Market share-beds (1) –4.64 0.001 
Market share-admissions (1) –3.15 0.032 
Average CIT rate (1) –4.36 0.002 
Note:  
 “(1)” indicates first difference 
 
As there is no theoretical justification on how many lags to include in the 
regression model, I simply assumed that the impact of CIT exemption dies off 
exponentially as time goes, so that, in theory, I can trace the impact infinitely into the 
past. Let MSt denote the market share in year t, and avgratet-j denote the average CIT rate 
at year t-j. (It is plausible to assume the exemption will start to show impact after j years.) 
Then the regression model takes the following forms. The exponential factor ρ has 
absolute value less than 1. 
tnjt
n
n
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As both time series of the dependent and independent variables are unit root 
nonstationary, first difference is necessary. The one year lag equation is 
11
0
101 −−−−
∞
=
− +×+= ∑ tnjt
n
n
t avgrateMS ερββ
. 
The first difference equation is as follows and both dependent and independent 
variables are stationary now. 
1
0
1 −−−
∞
=
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n
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In time-series literature, scholars usually define a backshift operator L, where for 
any time-series variable X, LXt=Xt-1, L2Xt=Xt-2. . . etc. Applying the backshift operator and 
disregarding the error terms for simplicity of the expression, the expected value equation 
becomes 
jtt avgrateL
MSE −Δ−×=Δ ρβ 1
1)( 1 , 
and after algebra manipulation, it becomes 
( ) ( ) jtttt avgrateMSMSEMSLE −− Δ×=Δ×−Δ=Δ− 11)1( βρρ  
which is the usual Autoregressive-Integrated-Moving-Average with explanatory variables 
(ARIMAX) model.  
 Besides the stationarity requirements for both dependent and independent 
variables, the ARIMAX model also requires the independent variable to be non-
autoregressive. (Brocklebank and Dickey [2003] provide an example showing that if the 
independent variable is autoregressive then the estimate is inconsistent.) If the 
independent variable is autoregressive, then a “prewhitening” process is necessary to 
remove the autoregression in the independent variable.  
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 We can check the autocorrelation in a white noise test with the Q statistic. The 
first column of table 3.2 shows that the Q statistics of the differenced independent 
variable—the average CIT rate—are insignificant. Further inspection of the first few lags 
of the average CIT rate variable shows that the autocorrelation coefficients of various 
orders are small; for example, the first-order autocorrelation coefficient for this 
differenced independent variable is only –0.075. Therefore, the first-differenced average 
CIT rate is not autoregressive and we can apply the ARIMAX regression to analyze the 
relationship between nonprofit hospitals market shares and the CIT rate. 
 
Table 3.2 Autocorrelation Check of First-Differenced Variables  
 Average CIT 
rate (1) 
Market share- 
beds (1) 
Market share-
admissions (1) 
up to 
lag 
Q 
statistics 
P-
value 
Q 
statistics
P-
value 
Q 
statistics
P-
value 
6 8.73 0.19 11.83 0.07 8.86 0.18 
12 10.56 0.57 17.18 0.14 13.25 0.35 
18 12.04 0.85 18.21 0.44 14.42 0.7 
24 17.28 0.84 22.4 0.56 19.11 0.75 
Note: 
(1) indicates first difference. 
 
 I also checked the autocorrelation of the differenced dependent variable—
nonprofit market share—with the Q statistics. As shown in the second column of Table 
3.2, the Q statistic testing that no autocorrelation for the differenced market share 
variable in terms of beds is 0.07 for the first six lags. Even though it is not significant at 
the 5% level, it still suggests weak autocorrelation in the first-differenced variable—
market share in terms of beds. The third column of Table 3.2 shows the autocorrelation 
check for the first-differenced market share variable in terms of admissions. The Q 
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statistics are not significant, suggesting insignificant autocorrelation in the first-
differenced market share variable in terms of admissions; however, further inspection 
shows that the first-order autocorrelation coefficient for that differenced variable is 0.343. 
Therefore, I specified that the first-differenced dependent variable is first-order 
autoregressive in the ARIMAX model. 
David (2003) argues that entrepreneurs need some time to adjust their market 
expectations and enter or exit the hospital industry; thus he collects data every four years. 
Similarly, Gulley and Santerre (1993) allow the adjusting period to be five years. I set the 
adjusting period to be five years, i.e. j=5. The first column of Table 3.3 summarizes the 
results from the ARIMAX regressions. The coefficients of the average CIT rate, β1, is 
positive, suggesting that if the average CIT rate increases by 1 percentage point in current 
year, it is expected to increase nonprofit hospitals’ market share in terms of beds by 0.035 
percentage point in the fifth year but it is only expected to increase nonprofit market 
share by 0.001 (=0.035*0.041) percentage point in the sixth year. Figure 3.6 illustrates 
the impact on nonprofit hospitals’ market share in terms of beds if the average CIT rate 
increases by one percentage point. The impact starts in the fifth year and then dies out 
quickly. The first-order autoregressive coefficient is positive, suggesting that if the 
nonprofit market share increases by one percentage point in the current year, it is 
expected to increase by 0.339 percentage point the next year, if the average CIT rate does 
not change. None of the coefficients is significant at a 5% significance level, but the 
impacts of CIT and autoregression are significant at a 10% level.  
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Table 3.3: ARIMAX Regression Results 
 1 2 3 4 
β1 0.035 0.034 0.040 0.043 
 (0.083) (0.069) (0.032) (0.015) 
ρ 0.041 . –0.234 . 
 (0.942) . (0.545) . 
AR (1) 0.339 0.325 0.515 0.538 
 (0.084) (0.085) (0.006) (0.003) 
Note:  
P-values are in the parentheses. 
Columns 1 and 2 show results for dependent variable of market share in terms of beds. 
Columns 3 and 4 show results for dependent variable of market share in terms of 
admissions.  
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Figure 3.6 Impacts on Nonprofit Hospitals’ Market Share in Terms of Beds from 
One Percentage Point Increase in CIT Rate 
 
 As the impact of CIT on nonprofit market share dies out very quickly and the p-
value of ρ is almost 1, I set ρ equal 0 and assumed that CIT affects nonprofit market share 
only in the fifth year. Column 2 of Table 3.3 summarizes the result. The coefficients of 
CIT and first-order autoregression hardly change, but the impact of CIT becomes more 
significant.  
 The ARIMAX regression results for market share in terms of admissions are 
shown in columns 3 and 4. As shown in column 3, if the average CIT rate increases by 1 
percentage point in the current year, it is expected to increase nonprofit hospitals market 
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share in terms of admissions by 0.040 percentage point in the fifth year, but it is expected 
to reduce nonprofit market share by 0.009 (=0.040*0.234) percentage point in the sixth 
year. However, the exponential coefficient, ρ, is not significant. After I excluded the 
lagged impact of CIT after 5 years (i.e. setting ρ equal 0), the impacts of CIT and the 
first-order autoregression do not change much. 
Even though the time-series regressions of the national aggregated data show 
support for the argument that CIT exemption helps NPOs increase market shares, the 
results can be subject to suspicion because sample size is relatively small. There are only 
36 yearly observations, which barely satisfy the smallest sample size requirement for 
ARIMAX analysis. Such a small size also prevents me from including additional control 
variables. Moreover, time series analysis relies on arbitrary judgment about impact lag 
and transfer functions, which undermines the credibility of such analysis. As I did the 
sensitivity analysis by allowing the adjusting period to be one through four years instead 
of five years, the coefficients of β1 were not significant even at a 10% level; they were 
even negative in some cases. Therefore, I further investigated the state level aggregated 
data which contains 50 states plus Washington D.C., and 21 years for each subject.  
3.5.2 State Level 
The state-level data is a longitudinal data, which allows us to assume fixed effects 
in the regression equation. However, nonprofit market shares in the national level exhibit 
strong autocorrelation, with 0.81 as the autocorrelation coefficient for market share in 
terms of beds and 0.99 for market share in terms of admissions, which suggest that 
nonprofit market shares at the state level should also exhibit some autocorrelation. The 
Arellano and Bond (1991) method specifically deals with such panel data with fixed 
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effects and an autoregressive dependent variable. Therefore, I used their method in my 
analysis of state-level nonprofit market share.  
In the literature, additional independent variables are usually included to control 
the impacts of other factors. Stenwald and Neuhauser (1970) only included two 
independent variables, percentage change in population and percentage change in per 
capita income between 1960 and 1967, in their cross-sectional analysis of proprietary 
hospital beds. Hansmann (1987b) cited their work and expanded their independent 
variable list. He used percentage change of population and percentage change of real per 
capita income over the past ten years to control the demand growth for hospital services. 
He also used governmental hospitals’ market share to measure governmental competition 
and included other variables such as philanthropic support and wealth of clientele as 
independent variables. Chang and Tuckman (1990) used population density and per 
capita income to control the demand for hospital service. They also controlled factors 
such as religious diversity and complex illnesses. Gulley and Santerre (1993) also used 
state population, real per capital income, and fraction of population covered by Medicare 
to control the demand for hospital services and included other variables, such as number 
of years under certificate-of-need laws for each state.  
Besides other variables, all the authors use population and per capita income as 
proxies for demand of hospital services. As I only have Gross State Product (GSP) and 
population time series for each state at hand, I include population and per capital GSP as 
independent variables. (I assumed that per capital GSP and per capital income do not 
differ much in their prediction of demand.) The population is a proxy of demand for 
hospital service in that greater population means more people need to go to the hospitals. 
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As for-profit hospitals are quicker to respond to demand (Steinwald & Neuhauser 1970), 
I expected that states with larger population size to have higher for-profit market shares 
and lower nonprofit market shares.  
The per capita GSP has two opposing impacts on nonprofit market share. First, it 
approximates the average wealth of the residents in each state, which measures the 
patients’ ability to pay for the hospital services. Because for-profit hospitals usually 
choose their location so as to serve the more profitable wealthy patients, I expected 
nonprofit hospitals’ market shares in rich states with higher per capital GSP to be lower. 
Second, states with higher per capita GSP usually impose a higher property tax rate and 
sales tax rate. As nonprofit hospitals are exempted from such taxes, they gain a 
competitive edge against for-profit hospitals, which suggests that nonprofit hospitals’ 
market share in states with higher per capita GSP is expected to be higher. The final 
impact of per capita GSP on nonprofit market share is not predicable, so I relied on the 
regression results to determine which impact is more powerful. 
I took the natural log of the population and the per capita GSP for three reasons. 
First, the natural log function downsizes the scale of population and per capital GSP. 
Second, it normalizes these two variables. Third and more important, it helps interpret the 
coefficients in a more sensible way—i.e., the coefficients correspond to the expected 
change in market share from 1% increase in population or per capital GSP. Suppose the 
regression equation is y = α + β*ln(x) + other control variables + error term. Take the 
derivate with regard to x and we have
x
xy ∂×=∂ β , which means that y increases by β 
percentage points from 1% increase in x. 
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 I also include government hospitals’ market share, as Hansmann (1987b) does, to 
control the governmental competition. Governments usually provide hospital services to 
their people, especially the poor. In areas where the government provides hospital 
services, potential nonprofit enterprisers, observing that hospital service demands are met 
by government hospitals, might have less incentive to establish nonprofit hospitals. 
Therefore, the competition from governmental hospitals has a negative impact on 
nonprofit hospitals’ market share. 
I believe that the cross-state variation within each year is more important than 
cross-time variation within each state in affecting hospitals’ market shares. Therefore, I 
assume that the demand variables—population and per capita GSP—and governmental 
competition variable have contemporary impacts on nonprofit market share, while the 
lagged CIT rates affect market share in the current year. The dynamic panel data model 
takes the following form. 
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CIT up to j years ago affects market shares; p means the market shares is an 
autoregressive of order p; vi is the fixed unobserved individual effects; and εi,t is serially 
uncorrelated but may be dependent across subjects, i.e. E(εi,t) = E(εi,t εi,s) = 0 for t ~=s. 
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I assumed that market shares at the state level have the same characteristics as 
they have at the national level. Therefore, as the ARIMAX model of the aggregated 
national data shows that the differenced market share is most autoregressive at order one, 
I only included the first lag of market share in the independent variable list. Similarly, as 
the ARIMAX model shows that CIT rates up to 5 years ago have impact on nonprofit 
market shares at the 10% significance level, I included lagged CIT rates from up to 5 
years ago. Because the differenced average CIT rate at the national level is not 
autoregressive, omission of the differenced average CIT rate of other lags won’t cause 
any endogeneity problem, even if CIT rates in other lagged years might also affect 
nonprofit market share. Thus, the first-differenced equation becomes 
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The no serial correlation assumption for the error term implies: 
 ( )[ ] 0,1,, =×− −− jtititiE εεε  where j = 2,..., t – 1 and t = 3,…, T. 
As the error term is assumed to be independent of all the independent variables, 
we can get the linear moment restrictions: 
[ ] ( )[ ] 0,1,,,, =×−=×Δ −−− jtititijtiti MSEMSE εεε  where j = 2,..., t –1 and t = 3,…, T. 
We can utilize this moment restrictions and apply the Generalized Method of 
Moment (GMM) to estimate those coefficients.  
Column 1 of Table 3.4 summarizes the regression results for market share in 
terms of beds. Population has a significant negative coefficient, which implies that as 
population increases by 1%, nonprofit hospitals’ market share is expected to decrease by 
0.038 percentage point. Per capital GSP has a significant positive impact on nonprofit 
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hospitals market share, suggesting that as per capita GSP increases by 1%, nonprofit 
hospitals’ market share is expected to increase by 0.025 percentage point. The positive 
coefficient of per capita GSP implies that the positive impact from sales and property 
taxes exemption exceeds the negative impact from for-profit hospitals’ choice to locate in 
wealthy states. The competition from government hospitals has a significant negative 
impact on nonprofit hospitals’ market shares. If government hospitals market increases 
by 1 percentage point, nonprofit hospitals market share decreases by 0.908 percentage 
point. Therefore, nonprofit hospitals and government hospitals almost completely 
substitute for each other. CIT exemption has a positive impact on nonprofit hospitals’ 
market share. The first two lags of CIT impact are not significant, but the latter three are. 
For example, if the average CIT rate 5 years ago increased by 1 percentage point, 
nonprofit hospitals market share is expected to increase by 0.039 percentage point.  
Column 2 of Table 3.4 shows the results of the regression of the market share in 
terms of admissions. Population and governmental competition impact market share in 
terms of admissions similar to the way they impact market share in terms of beds. 
However, the impact of per capita GSP is negative, contradictory to that in the regression 
of market share in terms of beds; nevertheless, the negative impact is not significant. 
Only the CIT rate 4 years ago has significant impact on market share in terms of 
admissions. However, the autoregressive coefficient in column 2 is not significant, which 
suggests that Arellano-Bond method may not be quite appropriate. Thus, I used fixed 
effects method for the regression of market share in terms of admissions. As shown in 
column 3, the CIT from the last year and from five years ago have significant impacts on 
nonprofit market share in current year, while the other lags do not. The impact of per 
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capita GSP is significantly positive, conforming to the estimate using the Arellano-Bond 
method for market share in terms of beds in column 1. 
 
Table 3.4: Arellano-Bond Regression Results 
Dependent variable: nonprofit 
hospitals’ market share 
1 
Beds 
2 
Admissions 
3 
Admissions 
Lag 1 of dependent variable: MSt-1 0.048** 0.029 . 
 (0.015) (0.018) . 
Average CIT rate 1st lag 0.027 0.026 0.096** 
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.037) 
Average CIT rate 2nd lag 0.037 0.017 – 0.004 
 (0.021) (0.022) (0.044) 
Average CIT rate 3rd lag 0.042* 0.020 0.058 
 (0.021) (0.022) (0.047) 
Average CIT rate 4th lag 0.041* 0.057** 0.058 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.043) 
Average CIT rate 5th lag 0.039** 0.021 0.079* 
 (0.016) 0.017 (0.034) 
Log(population) – 0.038*** – 0.069*** – 0.056*** 
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.015) 
Log(per capita GSP) 0.025*** – 0.007 0.013* 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Governmental hospitals’ market share – 0.908*** – 0.865*** – 0.957*** 
 (0.013) (0.016) (0.020) 
Arellano-Bond test statistic of zero 
2nd order serial correlation of 
residuals 
– 0.29 
[0.78] 
0.24 
[0.81] 
. 
Notes:  
Columns 1 and 2 use Arellano-Bond method, while column 3 just uses the fixed effects 
method. 
Standard deviations are in parentheses below the coefficients 
P-values are in the square brackets below the test statistics 
*significant at a 5% level; **significant at a 1% level ***significant at a 0.1% level 
 
The consistency of the Arellano-Bond GMM estimators requires the key 
assumption of no serial correlation in error terms. Arellano and Bond shows that we can 
check the plausibility of this assumption by seeing whether the first-differenced error 
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term is not second order serially correlated, i.e. E(Δεi,tΔεi,t-2) = 0. They propose an 
asymptotically normal statistic to test this key assumption. If the statistic is not significant 
then we cannot reject the null hypothesis (i.e., the key assumption) that the error term is 
not serial correlated and we can use the Arellano-Bond estimates with comfort. As shown 
in the bottom of Table 3.4, the second-order serial correlation test statistics in the 
regression of market share in terms of beds is – 0.29 and not significant at all, which 
provides confidence in the use of the Arellano-Bond method for the market share in terms 
of beds. 
3.6 Conclusions and Discussion 
The academics have been arguing why NPOs can compete with FPOs and the 
policy makers have been interested in finding out whether the exemption of CIT 
increases NPOs’ competitive edge. Empirical evidence is limited to the inspection of 
property and sales taxes exemption; however, the findings are conflicting. No work has 
been done to specifically study the impact of exemption from federal CIT. 
This essay examines the effect of CIT exemption on the market shares of 
nonprofit versus for-profit hospitals. It applies the ARIMAX regression on the national 
aggregated data from 1965 through 2000 and the Arellano-Bond method on the 
longitudinal data, which contains all the 50 states plus the District of Columbia from 
1975 through 1995. The results show that the coefficients of the average CIT rate are 
positive and significant, suggesting that CIT exemption does have a positive impact on 
nonprofit hospitals market share. 
Given the evidence from this paper that exemption is important to NPOs, it comes 
to the question—why should government only exempt the commercial NPOs but not both 
 84
NPOs and FPOs? If Steinberg’s (1987) argument is true that NPO managers pursue 
several emoluments at the cost of efficiency, including pleasant coworkers (who may be 
over-paid to ensure they will remain pleasant), discriminatory hiring practices, long lunch 
hours, magnificent offices, and larger, more prestigious market shares, why should the 
government subsidize the inefficient production by NPOs?  
Brody (1998) viewed the rationales for tax exemption of NPOs through a 
sovereignty perspective and classified the rationales into two general frameworks—base-
defining theory and the tax subsidy theory. The base-defining theory believes that NPOs 
compose a sovereignty parallel to the sovereignty of the government. (The historical 
background for this belief is that NPOs originate from the sovereignty of churches, which 
was parallel to the sovereignty of government in the pre-colonial times.) Thus, NPOs are 
entitled to earn income and own property free of tax because the state considers the NPOs 
as composing another sovereign. Therefore, the base-defining theory deems NPOs’ 
activity as not rising to the level of taxable activity and believes the NPOs’ income and 
property should fall outside of the tax base. In contrast, the tax subsidy theory places 
NPOs within the sovereignty of the government and believes that NPOs are subordinate 
to the government. The government decides whether NPOs provide goods and services 
the government desires and thus uses tax exemption to induce NPOs activities in the 
government’s desired way. Brody (1998) stated that the base-defining theory has 
difficulty in explaining why tax exemption extends to commercial NPOs, whose 
economic activity cannot be distinguished from that of for-profit enterprises. Several 
theories, falling in the tax subsidy framework, try to justify the tax exemption to 
commercial NPOs but not FPOs; however, none is compelling standing alone. First, 
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contract failure theory by Hansmann (1980) describes the failure of contract between 
government and FPOs. Governments want to subsidize certain goods, (e.g., hospital 
services) for the good of their citizens. However, it is very difficult for governments to 
monitor FPOs to see whether they take the subsidy into their shareholders’ pockets 
without improving or increasing their service; however, NPOs can be trusted with the 
subsidy due to the no-distribution constraint. This argument is weak because we cannot 
measure how much, if any, of a subsidy could be captured by the owners of FPOs. If only 
a small fraction of subsidy is at danger to be put into the owners’ pockets, we might be 
better off to subsidize FPOs as well and let FPOs drive NPOs out of market because 
FPOs operate more efficiently than NPOs. Also, in a fairly competitive market, 
competition will reduce FPOs’ potential to appropriate subsidies to the owners’ pocket. 
The second theory is the public good theory that says the goods and services 
provided by NPOs are public goods, whose production should be encouraged (Weisbrod 
1974, 1977). However his argument only justifies the subsidy to NPOs (most of them are 
donative NPOs) in the public good sector where there are few FPOs interested in 
entering; it fails to justify different tax treatment of NPOs and FPOs in the private goods 
sectors.  
The third theory is the compensation theory by Hansmann (1981) which is 
derived from the failure of contract between customers and providers. Customers trust 
that NPOs do not over-exploit them due to the non-distribution constraint. Such 
assurance brings efficiency gains such as a reduction in the efforts that consumers feel 
impelled to make to police the provider of a service, a reduction in the disparity between 
cost and price which reduce overall demand, and a prevention of degeneration into the 
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“lemon” type of market described by Akerlof (1970). However, the no-distribution 
constraint precludes NPOs from issuing equity as a way of acquiring capital to engage in 
their production; it is the government’s obligation to compensate NPOs to make up some 
of the disadvantages NPOs have in their access to capital (Hansmann, 1981). However, 
the weakness of this argument is that we simply cannot know whether the efficiency 
gains due to the existence of NPOs exceed the combined sum of tax revenue loss and 
efficiency loss from NPOs’ inefficient operation.  
The more serious problem with the third argument is that it is not clear whether 
consumers trust NPOs more than FPOs. Permut (1981) conducted a telephone survey in 
New Haven, Connecticut, asking for interviewees’ knowledge and impression of NPOs. 
He found that a majority of respondents failed to recognize five local nonprofit 
organizations as being nonprofit and did not feel (or were uncertain) that nonprofits 
would treat them more fairly or honestly than for-profits. Hansmann (1981) refuted 
Permut’s finding by pointing out the sample selection bias in his survey because many 
interviewees have never patronized the NPOs in the survey; he also cites findings from 
preliminary data from the child care decision-making survey supported by Yale 
University’s Program on Nonprofit Organizations in 1980, showing that only 8% of users 
of child care services did not know the nonprofit or for-profit status of the service 
provider they patronized. In more recent studies, David and Malani (2003) examined a 
sample of nonprofit hospital Web sites and found that 87% of those websites do not 
explicitly indicate that their hospitals are nonprofit, which seems to suggest that nonprofit 
hospitals do not believe that announcing nonprofit status will bring them more customers. 
VanSlyke and Roch (2004) used public opinion data and find that customers have 
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difficulties in telling nonprofit providers from governmental agencies and are more likely 
to misidentify nonprofit service providers as governmental agencies when they are less 
satisfied with the services that they have received. If customers are incapable of 
identifying nonprofit providers, then their trust in NPOs as predicted by the contract 
failure theory is in doubt. Philipson (2000) argued that if consumers trust NPOs more 
than FPOs, NPOs should be able to sell their product at a premium due to customers’ 
preference toward NPOs; however, using data in 1985 and 1995 from the nursing home 
industry, he finds that the price of nonprofit and for-profit nursing homes did not differ in 
1995 and for-profit nursing home even charged higher prices than nonprofit nursing 
homes in 1985.  
As none of the theories satisfactorily explains the rationale for subsidizing 
commercial NPOs, scholars have started comparing NPOs and FPOs empirically. If 
NPOs provide better service than FPOs, then tax exemption to commercial NPOs is 
justified as the government’s encouragement of and rewards for better service. Some of 
scholars have found evidence supporting such argument. For example, Marmor, 
Schlesinger, and Smithey (1987) summarized the empirical studies in the health care 
industry and concluded that FPO health care providers report lower costs but lower 
quality than NPOs, serve richer customers, and choose only profitable locations for their 
facilities. They also find that virtually all FPOs appear more likely to select patients on 
the basis of their ability to pay, locate in areas with higher incomes, and avoid offering 
services used most by indigent patients. Weisbrod and Schlesinger (1986) found that 
nonprofit nursing homes are more likely to provide high-quality output and for-profit 
firms are more likely to disappoint consumers.  
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However, other scholars have shown evidence that NPOs do not differ much from 
FPOs. Take the hospital industry as an example. Nonprofit hospitals are supposed to 
serve more poor people and provide a higher amount of uncompensated care than for-
profit hospitals. However, a series of studies (e.g., Sloan, Valvona & Perrin, 1986; Sloan 
1998; Young, Desai, & Lukas, 1997; and Mann, Melnick, Bamezai, & Zwanziger, 1997) 
do not find impressive evidence that nonprofit hospitals provide a disproportionately 
higher share of uncompensated care. For example, Sloan (1998) estimated that 
uncompensated care accounted for 4.1% of all expenses for nonprofits and 3.1% for for-
profit hospitals in 1983; and in 1994, the fractions became 5% and 4.2% for nonprofit 
and for-profit hospitals respectively. 
The findings from this paper add another possible reason to justify the exemption. 
As shown in Figure 3.4 and Figure 3.5, nonprofit hospitals charge a price barely covering 
their average expenditure, while for-profit hospitals earn a much higher profit margin. As 
most of the patients are covered by certain types of insurance, private or Medicare, the 
over-charging practice among for-profit hospitals will increase the insurance premium in 
general. The subsequent chain result might be that fewer people will be able to buy any 
insurance and the government’s Medicaid expense will soar. Therefore, the tax 
exemption of nonprofit hospitals is justified as a measure the government takes to limit 
the spread of for-profit hospitals. To extend this argument, general commercial NPOs, 
which concentrate in health care and education, charge less than their for-profit 
competitors due to reasons such as non-distribution constraints and “altruistic character.” 
On the other hand, various entry barriers such as expertise and government regulations 
forestall potential FPOs from entering the industry and thus lowering the profit margin of 
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existing FPOs. Therefore, tax exemption is a good measure to limit for-profit market 
share and give consumers a “fair” price. 
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CHAPTER 4 
FURTHER DISCUSSION 
The first essay tests competing theories of dividend taxation. However, ideal data 
for testing the theories is always rare. Researchers have to rely on some strong 
assumptions to fit their data to the testing, which causes limitations on sample selection. 
This is also true for the first essay, which uses C and S corporations in Georgia. First, due 
to the qualification conditions of S corporations set by the IRS, S corporations are 
generally small businesses. In my research, I assumed that only C corporations with 
equity less than the 99th percentile of the equity of S corporations are comparable to S 
corporations. There is a possibility that the dividend policy of small C corporations is 
different from that of large C corporations. Because large corporations compose the 
major portion of the corporate sector, the difference of dividend payout ratio among 
comparable C and S corporations might not be generalized to the comparison of S 
corporations and the whole C corporations sector.  
Secondly, there might be sample selection bias problems, because the data in the 
study is from the Georgia Department of Revenue and it is possible that the corporate 
economic activities in Georgia might not represent the whole corporate sector in the 
United States. More concerns about the sample come from the way I process the data. 
The study focuses on corporations that have been doing business continuously for several 
years; however, there are firms which do business in Georgia in one or another year so 
that they do not show up in the data for some years. As I rely on firms’ consecutive 
appearance to decide whether they switch their forms, I have to drop those firms 
appearing in discrete times, which might cause further sample selection problems.  
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The second essay examines the exemption of CIT on nonprofit organizations’ 
market share. Because it is difficult, if not impossible, to have data which include all 
types of nonprofit organizations, I used hospital data. It is possible that the hospital sector 
is not representative of the whole nonprofit sector, though it is a major part of it.  
Second, the essay uses ARIMAX to analyze the national aggregated market 
shares. However, there are only 35 observations. Even though this number exceeds the 
minimum number of 30 observations required for ARIMAX (Brocklebank & Dickey, 
2003), it is still a very small sample.  
Third, the second essay also analyzes the state level aggregated data. However, 
the state level data may not accurately reflect the competition between nonprofit and for-
profit hospitals. In some remote areas, especially the countryside, there exists only a 
single hospital, which means there is no competition in those areas. As there are more 
hospitals in the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), the MSA aggregated data may 
reflect the competition better and future analysis with MSA level data may be necessary. 
Fourth, in the regression of market shares on the CIT rate, it is ideal to have the 
average CIT rate in the hospital industry. However, as I cannot find specific rates in the 
hospital industry, I use the average CIT in the economy as a substitute. This substitute 
may introduce bias in the estimate of the impact if the CIT rate for hospitals differs a lot 
from that of average corporations. 
Fifth, in the longitudinal data analysis, there are unmeasured variables which 
affect the market shares of nonprofit hospitals. Such variables include citizens’ 
preference toward nonprofit and for-profit hospitals, state and local governments’ support 
to nonprofit hospitals, and the difference in health care quality between nonprofit and for-
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profit hospitals. I simply assume that the combined unmeasured effects are fixed for each 
state and use Arellano-Bond method to analyze the panel data. However, such 
assumption is very strong and the people’ preference governments’ attitude and quality 
difference may change over time. I may need to assume that the combined effects are 
random rather than fixed; however, current statistical software does not provide support 
for panel data with random effects and autocorrelation in the dependent variable. 
To the extent this study was limited, more extensive studies with more 
appropriate datasets are necessary. For instance, a more complete dataset with 
information of the number of shareholders in the comparison of C and S corporations and 
dataset containing all types of industries, rather than just the hospital industry, in the 
study of nonprofit versus for-profit market shares are desirable.  
 The policy implications from these two essays are complicated. The first essay 
provides evidence supporting the traditional view on dividend taxation that the double 
taxation reduces capital investment in the corporate sector; thus calls for the integration 
of corporate income tax and personal income tax or the cut in dividend tax. The second 
essay proves that tax exemption does increase nonprofit hospitals’ market share. If the 
profitability comparisons, as shown in figure 3.5, are correct that nonprofit hospitals 
charge a fair price while for-profit hospitals charge a price much higher than their costs, 
then governments should continue the tax subsidies to nonprofit hospitals in order to keep 
hospitalization cost low. Both essays suggest the federal government forgiving some tax 
revenues.  
However, wise policy makers should not rush to the conclusion for dividend tax 
cut and further tax subsidies for NPOs. It is necessary to do a systematic cost-benefit 
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analysis including not only the efficiency gains from such tax cut and tax subsidies, but 
also the loss of social welfare due to cut in tax revenue supported social programs.   
Furthermore, political considerations are also necessary. The simple repeal of 
dividend tax may achieve the economic optimal; however, most people will not satisfy 
with such repeal because it is unfair to those relatively poor, who derive most of their 
income from salary, pay income taxes on salary, while those relative wealthy, who derive 
a significant portion of their income from capital investment, do not pay dividend tax. 
Therefore, the findings of this dissertation only serve to provide certain empirical 
evidences for theoretical and practical discussions rather than guidelines for policy 
makers. More systematical research and comprehensive considerations are necessary in 
policy decisions. 
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